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SUPERIOR STATUS: RELATIONAL
OBSTACLES IN THE LAW TO RACIAL
JUSTICE AND LGBTQ EQUALITY
OSAMUDIA JAMES *
Abstract: Animus and discrimination are the two legal lenses through which inequality is typically assessed and understood. Insufficient attention, however, is
paid to the role of status in animating inequality, even in landmark cases thought
to be equality-promoting. More than an animating force between intractable political conflicts, status also informs the development of equality law in the United
States. When courts, advocates, and policymakers affirm, ignore, miss, or concede to status hierarchies instead of dismantling them, those groups that perceive
a decrease in their status relative to others will only use “equality-promoting”
doctrine to rebalance status hierarchy in their favor. Public school integration and
same-sex marriage threatened status hierarchies primarily favoring white people
in the former, and straight white males in the latter. Thus, both movements present opportunities to consider how education and marriage work to secure status,
examine how the two “successful” equality movements actually preserved and
created new opportunities for superordinate groups to maintain superior status,
and theorize how law might better account for retrenchment demanded by the
status-privileged.

INTRODUCTION
In the fall of 2020, following one of the most polarized presidential elections in recent American history, noted journalist and academic Thomas Edsall
named status as the key driver of “intractable conflicts between left and right,
© 2022, Osamudia James. All rights reserved.
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Democrats and Republicans, liberals and conservatives” in America.1 Situating
status competition as a force behind Trumpism, the rise of identity politics
among whites, and increasingly destabilized democracy, Edsall named a
“[r]esentment [t]hat [n]ever [s]leeps” among the previously powerful, whose
fading hegemonic power will dictate the future of American politics. 2 Indeed,
Edsall later named waning status as having animated the manifestation of that
resentment in the form of attacks on the U.S. Capitol in January 2021. 3
Observers of American democracy name status as a problem for good
reason. Social status is ultimately about how groups—and the individuals that
compose them—are valued by society. Status changes, as a result of successful
political or social movements for equality, are relational and perceived as zerosum. Based on social science research, we can expect that perceptions of diminished social status relative to minoritized or lower-status groups will
prompt attempts among the privileged to reinstate their superordinate status. 4
Status competition, however, is not limited only to political conflict. Rather, that competition is also implicated in advancements in American law.
More concerning yet, obstacles to status equality are embedded in American
law, even in those landmark cases thought to be equality-promoting. The interaction of law and societal status remains undertheorized, in part because lawyers understand the phrase “status” as referring to individual characteristics
with legal consequences, which is distinct from positionality in a social hierarchy. 5 Moreover, status is distinct from animus or discrimination, the two behavioral modes through which legal fights regarding equality are often understood.
Law and long-term litigation strategies in pursuit of equality, however,
can entrench social hierarchy positioning, buttressing status even as equality
movements attempt to dismantle it. Landmark cases implicating equality fail to
1
Thomas B. Edsall, Opinion, The Resentment That Never Sleeps, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 9, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/09/opinion/trump-social-status-resentment.html [https://perma.cc/
D6XS-8MGL].
2
Id.
3
Thomas B. Edsall, Opinion, White Riot, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 13, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/
2021/01/13/opinion/capitol-riot-white-grievance.html [https://perma.cc/F79P-ACTW].
4
See Lawrence D. Bobo, Prejudice as Group Position: Microfoundations of a Sociological Approach to Racism and Race Relations, 55 J. SOC. ISSUES 445, 468 (1999) (describing prejudice as not
just involving “negative feelings and beliefs,” but rather as also concerning “emotion-laden, normatively powerful, and interest-infused commitment to a preferred group position”).
5
J.M. Balkin, The Constitution of Status, 106 YALE L.J. 2313, 2324–25 (1997). Balkin notes two
additional distinctions between legal and sociological status: (1) in contrast to sociological status
which “is usually tied to a system of social hierarchy,” legal status “is primarily concerned with legal
meanings and legal consequences”; and (2) “the legal concept of status is often distinguished from
conduct,” while “sociological status groups are differentiated by many different cultural markers,
including speech, patterns of behavior, tastes, and styles of life.” Id. at 2325.
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engage status in both doctrine and dicta; this omission not only undercuts the
symbolic and substantive significance of equality “wins,” but also preserves
doctrinal paths for the status-threatened to reinstate or reaffirm superordinate
positioning. Legal scholarship regarding status has drawn useful contours in
this area, acknowledging the role of status in legal fights, or arguing for norms
of constitutional interpretation that dismantle unjust social hierarchies. 6 This
Article builds on that work, drawing distinctions between status and the other
behavioral motivations for inequality typically recognized in law, and showing
how inattention to status helped stall two “successful” equality movements.
Education and marriage serve as useful contexts within which to make
this contribution. In assessing the movement for same-sex marriage, advocates,
politicians, and journalists compared the fight for marriage equality to the midtwentieth century movement for education equality, characterizing the former
as a new front in civil rights—the “[n]ext Brown.” 7 Despite key distinctions,
the comparisons had some merit. 8 Access to both quality education and to marId. at 2326.
Raffy Ermac, Listen: Biden Says Marriage Equality Case Could Be Next Brown v. Board of
Education, THE ADVOCATE (May 4, 2015), https://www.advocate.com/politics/marriage-equality/
2015/05/04/listen-biden-says-marriage-equality-case-could-be-next-brown-v [https://perma.cc/84KSHUJK]; Michael J. Klarman, Opinion, Gay Rights May Get Its Brown v. Board of Education, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 11, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/12/opinion/gay-rights-may-get-its-brownv-board-of-education.html [https://perma.cc/K5Y6-QT5L]; Brian Palmer, Is This What Brown v.
Board Felt Like?, SLATE (June 26, 2013), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2013/06/supreme-courtgay-marriage-rulings-is-this-our-generations-brown-v-board-of-education.html [https://perma.cc/
9RZV-RB5Y]; see also Anthony Michael Kreis, Stages of Constitutional Grief: Democratic Constitutionalism and the Marriage Revolution, 20 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 871, 945–46 (2018) (noting that “legislators us[ed] civil rights cases from the 1950s and 1960s (typically Brown v. Board of Education and
Loving v. Virginia) to legitimize their votes to legalize same-sex marriage”). Compare Katherine M.
Franke, The Politics of Same-Sex Marriage Politics, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 236, 237 (2006)
(noting that the Lawrence v. Texas decision which decriminalized same-sex intimacy was “widely
referred to in the lesbian and gay legal community as ‘our Brown,’ . . . . [And it] would usher in a civil
rights revolution for gay men and lesbians in a fashion equivalent to the civil rights movement inaugurated by Brown”), with Holning Lau, From Loving to Obergefell: Elevating the Significance of Discriminatory Effects, 25 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & LAW 317, 318 (2018) (arguing that the Court’s focus on
discriminatory effects in Obergefell v. Hodges distinguish it from the Court’s opinions in both Loving
v. Virginia and Brown v. Board of Education on discriminatory intent). See generally Obergefell v.
Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 672 (2015) (holding that marriage is a fundamental right extended to same-sex
couples under both the Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (holding that laws banning interracial marriage are
unconstitutional); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (holding that racial segregation in
public schools is unconstitutional), supplemented by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
8
Zero-sum claims on resources that often inform educational disputes did not define the movement for same-sex marriage. Further, public approval of same-sex marriage prior to the marriage
equality cases was arguably more favorable than at the time that Brown was decided, or even during
the aftermath. See generally 347 U.S. at 494–95 (ruling that racial segregation was unconstitutional in
public schools). On the eve of the Supreme Court’s decision in Obergefell in June of 2015, “a 57%majority of Americans [favored] allowing same-sex marriage and 39% of Americans [disfavored it].”
6
7
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riage, for example, serve as potent symbols of citizenship, social belonging,
and status—a key reason activists and advocates focused on both. Moreover,
discourse regarding same-sex marriage echoed themes about access to public
goods that earlier defined American public education.
Both movements further resulted in legal victories that required people in
the majority to fundamentally reassess and change their treatment of those in a
minority group. And in the beginning, equality gains were ostensibly being
made. After reaching a high-water mark of integration in the early 1970s, 9 however, the rate of school segregation has steadily increased. 10 This re-segregation
PEW RSCH. CTR., SUPPORT FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AT RECORD HIGH, BUT KEY SEGMENTS REMAIN OPPOSED 1 (2015), https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/2015/06/68-15-Same-sex-marriage-release1.pdf [https://perma.cc/WF46-8PC4]. See generally Obergefell, 576
U.S. at 672 (holding that the fundamental right to marry extends to same-sex couples). Just five years
before that, disapproval of same sex-marriage (48%) was higher than approval for it (42%). PEW
RSCH. CTR., supra, at 1. Public polling after the decision in Brown “found that 55% of Americans
approved of the decision, and 40% disapproved.” Joseph Carroll, Race and Education 50 Years After
Brown v. Board of Education, GALLUP (May 14, 2004), https://news.gallup.com/poll/11686/raceeducation-years-after-brown-board-education.aspx [https://perma.cc/6HGE-ANN5]. Five years later,
however, “[a] May 1959 poll found that 53% of Americans said the decision caused a lot more trouble
than it was worth.” Id. In contrast, support for same-sex marriage was on the rise and continued rising
after Obergefell and subsequent rulings. Moreover, unlike state legislators’ explicitly articulated opposition to Brown and states’ decade-long refusal to make good on Brown’s mandates, there was ultimate acceptance of the same-sex rulings, or at least no politicians vowing explicity to disobey or rebel
in response to United States v. Windsor and Obergefell. Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 672 (ruling concerning the constitutionality of same-sex marriage); United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 751–52
(2013) (holding that Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act was unconstitutional); Brown, 347 U.S.
at 495 (holding that “separate but equal” in public schools is unconstitutional); see KEVIN M. KRUSE,
WHITE FLIGHT: ATLANTA AND THE MAKING OF MODERN CONSERVATISM 131–34 (2007) (documenting immediate resistance to Brown, including the Georgia governor’s assertion that “[t]he court has
thrown down the gauntlet . . . . [And] Georgians accept the challenge and will not tolerate the mixing
of the races in the public schools or any of its tax-supported public institutions”); see also Carlos A.
Ball, The Backlash Thesis and Same-Sex Marriage: Learning from Brown v. Board of Education and
Its Aftermath, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1493, 1505–16 (2006) (comparing “[t]he political and
legal responses to Brown” with Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, a 2003 Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court decision holding that the Massachusetts Constitution requires the state to
legally recognize same-sex marriage). See generally Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d
941 (Mass. 2003).
9
See infra note 36 and accompanying text (discussing integration in the South during the 1970s).
10
According to the National Center on Education Statistics, “the number of segregated schools
(defined . . . as those schools where less than 40 percent of students are white) has . . . doubled between
1996 and 2016. . . . [When] the percentage of children of color attending such a school rose from 59 to 66
percent.” Will Stancil, School Segregation Is Not a Myth, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 14, 2018), https://www.
theatlantic.com/education/archive/2018/03/school-segregation-is-not-a-myth/555614/ [https://perma.cc/
Y2NU-3926]. “For black students, the percentage in segregated schools rose even faster, from 59 to
71 percent.” Id.; see also Alvin Chang, The Data Proves That School Segregation Is Getting Worse,
VOX (Mar. 5, 2018), https://www.vox.com/2018/3/5/17080218/school-segregation-getting-worse-data
[https://perma.cc/3UQE-SHAJ] (concluding that “black students in the South are less likely to attend a
school that is majority white than about 50 years ago”); GARY ORFIELD, ERICA FRANKENBERG,
JONGYEON EE & JOHN KUSCERA, THE C.R. PROJECT, BROWN AT 60: GREAT PROGRESS, A LONG
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has taken place long after Brown v. Board of Education’s prohibition on de jure
segregated schools, facilitated by a series of cases applying the Fourteenth
Amendment’s equal protection mandates, and is helped along by individuals
that purport to be progressive on matters of racial equality. 11 Indeed, in 2018
white parents in New York City stridently opposed school enrollment plans
that would facilitate racial integration of the city’s public schools; instead they
advocated for devoting more resources for their children’s racially isolated
peers. 12
Retrenchment in same-sex marriage has arguably started even sooner. In
2015 (the same year that the Supreme Court struck down state bans on samesex marriage) the Court of Appeals of Colorado heard challenges to the state’s
prohibitions against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in places
of public accommodation. 13 Although the Supreme Court ultimately resolved
the issue in Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission
on free exercise grounds, the Court did not directly address the “liberty versus
equality” challenge which threatens to undercut social gains for gay and lesbian couples. 14
Shaped by landmark equality rulings, school integration and marriage
both serve as important case studies for better contextualizing “victories” in
equality law, for understanding and predicting retrenchment, and for better appreciating the interplay of law and social status. Despite being cast as key
signposts along the path to substantive equality, the movements for same-sex
marriage and public-school integration reified status. This was in part because
the doctrine and remedies which emerged from the movements failed to undercut the consensuality of beliefs that inform and stabilize status hierarchies and
RETREAT AND AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE 10 (2014), https://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12education/integration-and-diversity/brown-at-60-great-progress-a-long-retreat-and-an-uncertainfuture/Brown-at-60-051814.pdf [https://perma.cc/UVL5-MNVH] (explaining that “[t]he percentage of
[Black] students in majority white schools is lower than it was in 1968”).
11
347 U.S. at 494–95 (holding that racial segregation in public schools is unconstitutional).
12
Lindsey Christ, Student Diversity Push Upsets Some Parents at UWS School, SPECTRUM NEWS
NY1 (Apr. 25, 2018), https://www.ny1.com/nyc/all-boroughs/news/2018/04/25/push-to-boost-middleschool-diversity-upsets-some-uws-parents-# [https://perma.cc/REQ5-JZ6Z]. Two years prior, opposition to integration plans also made headlines when a series of meetings turned contentious as parents
accused officials of dishonesty, referred to a majority-minority school as a “cesspool,” harassed supporters of integration plans, and “wept . . . [while] plead[ing] with the city” to abandon changes to
enrollment plans. Eliza Shapiro, New Upper West Side School Integration Plans Reignite an Old
Fight, POLITICO (Oct. 25, 2016), https://www.politico.com/states/new-york/city-hall/story/2016/10/
upper-west-side-school-integration-fight-goes-back-50-years-106679 [https://perma.cc/7QVJ-DKA6].
13
Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 2015 COA 115 (concerning discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation in a place of public accommodation), rev’d sub nom., Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd.
v. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018).
14
See 138 S. Ct. at 1723–24 (concluding that the Colorado Civil Rights Commission had been
impermissibly hostile to religion in handling the claim filed against Masterpiece Cakeshop).
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left available opportunities for retrenchment. Failing to appreciate the impact
of status only increases the likelihood that courts, advocates, and policymakers
will affirm, ignore, miss, or concede to status hierarchies, instead of dismantling them.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I describes the current state of
public-school integration and marriage equality. 15 Despite the advent of Brown
and its progeny, scholars increasingly note that public schools are more segregated today than they were at the time of the Courts’ germinal desegregation
ruling. 16 Included among the multiple factors that contribute to this phenomenon is the ongoing preservation of white schools, facilitated by white parental
choices. Distinct from the explicit opposition to public school integration observed in the years after Brown, this pattern runs counter to the support white
parents articulate regarding racial equality in public schools. Similarly, the
gains of marriage equality are also stymied: after the triumph of Obergefell v.
Hodges, subsequent suits involved denials of service to same-sex couples on
the basis of religious beliefs. 17 Described not as opposition to the equality of
same-sex couples, but rather as expressions of faith, this clash of liberty and
equality also threatens the stability of the Obergefell “win.” These qualifications to the initial proclamations of equality reflect status conflicts the law
does not address and movement litigation insufficiently contemplates.
See infra notes 21–88 and accompanying text.
Although this Article’s exploration of segregation and integration are anchored in the Blackwhite binary, many minority groups in the United States have histories of school segregation that are
similar to and distinct from the segregation of Black schoolchildren in America. See, e.g., Christopher
Arriola, Knocking on the Schoolhouse Door: Mendez v. Westminster, Equal Protection, Public Education, and Mexican Americans in the 1940’s, 8 LA RAZA L.J. 166, 167 (1995) (examining “Mexican
school segregation in Orange County,” California); see also Kim D. Chanbonpin, Between Black and
White: The Coloring of Asian Americans, 14 WASH. U. GLOB. STUD. L. REV. 637, 647–52 (2015)
(detailing the Gong Lum v. Rice school challenge alongside other cases in which Asian Americans
“argued legal claims to Whiteness”); Robert S. Chang, Toward an Asian American Legal Scholarship:
Critical Race Theory, Post-Structuralism, and Narrative Space, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 1241, 1294 (1993)
(contrasting widespread knowledge of Brown with minimal awareness of Gong Lum v. Rice, a case in
which “Asian Americans . . . challenged the legality of segregated schools”); Ariela J. Gross, “The
Caucasian Cloak”: Mexican Americans and the Politics of Whiteness in the Twentieth-Century
Southwest, 95 GEO. L.J. 337, 370–83 (2007) (examining how state actors in mid-twentieth-century
Texas and California used Mexican Americans’ nominal white identity to create and protect Jim Crow
practices through school desegregation); Sora Y. Han, The Politics of Race in Asian American Jurisprudence, 11 UCLA ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 1, 1–12 (2006) (using Gong Lum v. Rice as an example of
how Asian Americans “respond[ed] to the legal constraints of Jim Crow”); Allison Brownell Tirres,
Latinos and the Law, in OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN HISTORY 16–18 (2018),
https://oxfordre.com/americanhistory/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780199329175.001.0001/acrefore9780199329175-e-364 [https://perma.cc/33YU-2RV4] (contextualizing school segregation against
broader patterns of discrimination and exclusion). See generally Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78, 87
(1927) (holding that excluding a Chinese child from a public school was constitutional).
17
See generally, e.g., Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1719.
15
16
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Part II describes how status functions in a manner distinct from animus or
discrimination in the distribution of material resources, the two analytical
frames through which equality bids are typically engaged, and to which equality jurisprudence is most responsive. 18 Education and marriage are valuable
social goods that deeply implicate status, working to affirm white supremacy
in the case of the former, and (white) patriarchy in the latter. The rhetoric and
doctrine developed in Brown and Obergefell to advance public-school integration and same-sex marriage failed to undercut the consensuality of status, thus
further enshrining these regressive cultural commitments, and counterintuitively helping to constitute a “vocabulary” that operationalizes the grammar of
status hierarchy. 19
Part III draws conclusions from the operation of status in education and
marriage, theorizing what the impact of status on otherwise progressive wins
in public-school integration and same-sex marriage mean for movement litigation and social policy going forward. 20 Status hierarchies may be inevitable,
but anticipating the influence of status may help ensure more stable equality
wins going forward.
I. EQUALITY STALLED
Despite landmark wins regarding public-school integration and same-sex
marriage, the promise of full equality has not yet been realized. Status can animate conflicts that equality law does not necessarily address. Such is the case
in both education and marriage. Section A considers status conflicts in the former, 21 while Section B considers the same in the latter. 22
A. Education
Education provides individual and societal benefits that render it highly
valuable for those who can access it. Broad access to education results in an
increased propensity to vote, increased civic engagement, lower public health
costs, and lower unemployment rates. 23 Like adequate healthcare and security,
See infra notes 89–213 and accompanying text.
CECILIA L. RIDGEWAY, STATUS: WHY IS IT EVERYWHERE? WHY DOES IT MATTER? 151
(2019).
20
See infra notes 214–273 and accompanying text.
21
See infra notes 23–53 and accompanying text.
22
See infra notes 54–88 and accompanying text.
23
See, e.g., Susan H. Bitensky, Theoretical Foundations for a Right to Education Under the U.S.
Constitution: A Beginning to the End of the National Education Crisis, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 550, 554–
63 (1992) (discussing how education impacts preparation for a competitive labor market); James E.
Ryan, The Supreme Court and Public Schools, 86 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1394–1432 (2000) (discussing
education as a socializing function); Denise A. Hartman, Constitutional Responsibility to Provide a
18
19
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education is recognized among some scholars as providing “the content for
deliberative democracies,” and being fundamental to well-functioning societies. 24 Sociologists note that “[e]ducation is an important form of currency in
systems of social stratification[,] . . . open[ing] up avenues for social mobility,
operating as a “form[] of cultural capital[,]” and motivating parents to seek a
“quality education” in order “to maximize a child’s life chances.” 25
Although formal education is not a prerequisite for American citizenship,
education and citizenship are closely aligned in American culture. The writings
of the Founding Fathers, for example, reflected an early understanding of education as a public good to be distributed in service of citizenship and governance. 26 Supreme Court cases describe education as “the very foundation of
good citizenship,” 27 “places where we inculcate the values essential to the
meaningful exercise of rights and responsibilities by a self-governing citizenry,” 28 and where skills are taught that maintain the integrity of the electoral
process in pursuit of the “democratic ideal.” 29 Scholars argue that the original
purpose of public education was to prepare citizens to participate actively in
self-government. 30

System of Free Public Schools: How Relevant Is the States’ Experience to Shaping Governmental
Obligations in Emerging Democracies?, 33 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 95, 96–102 (2005)
(providing a summary of U.S. public education and its effects on society); Suzanna Sherry, Responsible Republicanism: Educating for Citizenship, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 131, 133–56 (1995) (discussing
“the literature on rights and republicanism”).
24
AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, WHY DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY? 137 (2004). But
see Erika K. Wilson, Blurred Lines: Public School Reforms and the Privatization of Public Education,
51 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 189, 224–25 (2016) (arguing that as a tool for social mobility, education
ceases to serve a democratic purpose, and instead serves private striving in a stratified society).
25
David Sikkink & Michael O. Emerson, School Choice and Racial Segregation in US Schools:
The Role of Parents’ Education, 31 ETHNIC & RACIAL STUD. 267, 270–71, 273 (2008).
26
Benjamin Franklin advocated for public education so that men would be “qualified to serve the
public with honor to themselves, and to their country.” BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, PROPOSALS RELATING
TO THE EDUCATION OF YOUTH IN PENNSYLVANIA (1749), reprinted in 1 THE WORKS OF BENJAMIN
FRANKLIN app. 3, at 570 (Jared Sparks ed., 1840).
27
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954); see also W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 647 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (noting that the purpose of schools is to
prepare students for the rights and responsibilities of citizenship).
28
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 373 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
29
See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35–36 (1973) (“Exercise of the
franchise . . . cannot be divorced from the educational foundation of the voter. The electoral process, if
reality is to conform to the democratic ideal, depends on an informed electorate: a voter cannot cast
his ballot intelligently unless his reading skills and thought processes have been adequately developed.”).
30
See Derek W. Black, The Fundamental Right to Education, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1059,
1095–1112 (2019) (using historical evidence to argue that the original purpose of public education
was to prepare citizens to participate actively in self-government).
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Despite its value, (or perhaps because of it) distribution of, and access to
K-12 education in the United States has been raced. 31 By the time Black people in the United States gained widespread access to the public-school system,
it was typically on a de jure segregated basis. Dismantling “separate but equal”
schooling in public education formed the cornerstone of legal challenges that
ultimately produced Brown v. Board of Education’s prohibition on school segregation by race. 32 The initial Brown decision, however, provided no guidance
on dismantling segregation, nor did it direct any remedial action, while its follow-up a year later only exhorted lower states and parties to integrate “with all
deliberate speed.” 33
After years of Southern recalcitrance, the federal government began to
condition the receipt of funding on the absence of discriminatory practices, 34
and the Supreme Court provided desegregation guidance to the states. 35 By the
early 1970s, the South was more integrated than any other region in the United
States. 36 That integration, however, was short-lived. Regression started in 1974
with Milliken v. Bradley, a case in which the Court held that absent an “interdistrict violation,” the Court could not order an interdistrict integration remedy. 37 This, despite the fact that an interdistrict order including the white suburbs surrounding the racially isolated Black Detroit city schools was the only
way effectively to remedy state-sanctioned segregation that had undermined
31
Although this Article focuses on public school integration in the K-12 context, racial disparities
in higher education also present obstacles to inequality. Responses to these disparities have animated
no shortage of litigation regarding responses to those disparities and implicate similar status dynamics. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 319–20 (1978) (declaring the UC
Davis School of Medicine’s admissions policy unconstitutional); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306,
343–44 (2003) (affirming the University of Michigan Law School’s holistic application process which
considered race among many factors in admissions); Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 570 U.S. 297,
314–15 (2013) (affirming that strict scrutiny should apply to judicial review of race-conscious admissions policies).
32
RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND
BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 168–72 (Alfred A. Knopf 2d ed. 2004) (1975) (documenting the myth of “separate but equal” schools for Blacks as the foundation for the NAACP’s ultimate challenge to segregation before the Supreme Court).
33
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494–96 (1954); see also Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S.
294, 301 (1955) (“[E]nter such orders and decrees consistent with this opinion as are necessary and
proper to admit to public schools on a racially nondiscriminatory basis with all deliberate speed the
parties to these cases.”). The same opinion also qualified compliance based on practicality of implementation. Brown, 349 U.S. at 299.
34
42 U.S.C. § 2000(d).
35
Green v. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 436 (1968) (defining the meaning of a “unitary” school
system); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 25, 28–31 (1971) (identifying
mathematical ratios reflecting “the racial composition of [entire] system” as a “useful starting point,”
and sanctioning bussing).
36
Gary Orfield, Turning Back to Segregation, in DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION: THE QUIET
REVERSAL OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 1, 8 (Gary Orfield & Susan E. Eaton eds., 1996).
37
418 U.S. 717, 745 (1974).
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the city schools and encouraged white flight to the suburbs. 38 Regression deepened in the early 1990s after a trio of Supreme Court cases brought the federal
judiciary’s oversight of integration to an end. 39 Facilitated by the residential
segregation that informed school assignments after desegregation orders were
lifted, and the economic capacity of white parents to build and maintain white
urban and suburban enclaves, the rate of segregation in American schools has
steadily increased since then. 40
Whether de jure or de facto, segregation imposes harsh material penalties
on Black school children. Public school financing in the United States, for example, is tied to local tax bases even as residential segregation persists. Facilitated by the American history of housing discrimination, federal and state redlining, and blockbusting, Blacks are more likely to live in racially isolated
neighborhoods that concentrate poverty, and thus circumscribe the tax bases on
which school districts draw for funding. Disparities in funding are telling: a
2019 study found that non-white school districts received $23 billion less in
funding than white schools, and that for every student enrolled, non-white
school districts received $2,226 less than white districts. 41
These funding disparities not only create predictable differences in curricular quality, but also shape neighborhood characteristics that impact life outcomes. The better-funded schools that whites are more likely to attend “have
benefitted from a racial monopoly surplus” which ensures better cognitive training and employment networks. 42 This phenomenon creates a feedback loop that
provides whites with opportunity and security while further stratifying neighborhoods by race and class such that Blacks and Latinos cannot escape isolation without suffering displacement. 43 Ultimately, the system established to
finance K-12 public education inures to the benefit of whites.

Id. at 725–30 (summarizing the district court’s reasoning in ordering the remedy).
See Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 250 (1991) (endorsing the termination of desegregation orders once school districts become unitary, even if resegregation is likely); see also Freeman v.
Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 490 (1992) (giving federal courts “the authority to relinquish supervision and
control of schools districts[’] [desegregation plans] in incremental stages,” notwithstanding the likelihood that students would never attend comprehensively integrated school systems); Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 87, 90–92 (1995) (declaring that a district court could not, as part of a desegregation order, mandate government expenditures for a plan that solicited voluntary interdistrict integration absent interdistrict segregation violations).
40
See supra note 10 and accompanying text (explaining that public schools are more segregated
than they were more than fifty years ago).
41
EDBUILD, $23 BILLION, at 2, app. A (2019), https://edbuild.org/content/23-billion/full-report.
pdf [https://perma.cc/AX8H-R5FL].
42
See Daria Roithmayr, Them That Has, Gets, 27 MISS. COLL. L. REV. 373, 384–88 (2008).
43
See id. at 88 (describing a feedback loop which reproduces inequality through geography and
space, in which disparities in school financing is a key factor).
38
39
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Moreover, this form of school segregation is particularly impervious to
legal remedies. Even in communities and among parents that profess a commitment to diversity and equality, whites oppose attempts to integrate public
schools, 44 or simply choose white schools when given the option. 45 Studies suggest that white parents, in particular, use race to inform school selection, preferring white schools to Black schools even when other factors like resources are
otherwise equal. 46 Other research shows that white parents select higherpercentage white schools more often as the percent of Black children in the
residential area increases. 47 In some studies, as much as seventy-five percent of
the variation in school choice preferences “is explained by the percentage of
[Black] students” in the schools considered. 48
Building on parental liberty and control cases like Pierce v. Society of Sisters and Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Court has signaled to parents that they can
make education choices in isolation, and that the Court will not insist on recognizing the greater public costs of those private decisions. 49 Incidentally, “the
44
See Regina Garcia Cano & Sarah Rankin, Parent Resistance Thwarts Local School Desegregation Efforts, AP NEWS (Jan. 29, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/ap-top-news-education-new-yorkcity-courts-us-news-4e818872210464f07d23fc1259a49ebf [https://perma.cc/9C8J-CDWK] (documenting the opposition of “affluent, well-organized and mostly white parents” to desegregation attempts in New York City; Richmond, Virginia; and Howard County, Maryland).
45
See ERIC TORRES & RICHARD WEISSBOURD, MAKING CARING COMMON PROJECT, HARVARD
GRADUATE SCH. OF EDUC., DO PARENTS REALLY WANT SCHOOL INTEGRATION? 3 (2020), https://
static1.squarespace.com/static/5b7c56e255b02c683659fe43/t/5e30a6280107be3cf98d15e6/1580246
577656/Do+Parents+Really+Want+School+Integration+2020+FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/23VRCMVC] (finding that without conducting their own research, “many White, advantaged parents appear
to determine school quality by how many other White, advantaged parents send their child to a
school”); see also Helen F. Ladd & Mavzuna Turaeva, Parental Preferences for Charter Schools in
North Carolina: Implications for Racial Segregation and Isolation, 26–28, 31–33 (EdWorkingPaper
No. 20-195, 2020), https://www.edworkingpapers.com/sites/default/files/ai20-195.pdf [https://perma.
cc/ZA6R-VSFW] (concluding that the racial composition of schools dominate the concerns of white
parents in North Carolina more than academic performance or special programming).
46
See generally Chase M. Billingham & Matthew O. Hunt, School Racial Composition and Parental Choice: New Evidence on the Preferences of White Parents in the United States, 89 SOCIO.
EDUCATION 99 (2016) (discussing factors, such as race, that parents consider when choosing a school
for their child).
47
See generally Sikkink & Emerson, supra note 25, at 267, 276, 285 (finding that “the racial
composition of schools plays an important role in the schooling choices of highly educated whites,”
with “whites [being] more likely to select alternative, higher-percentage-white schooling for their
children” as the Black composition “in a residential area increases,” an effect “that is amplified for
highly educated whites (but not highly educated Blacks) (emphasis added)).
48
Salvatore Saporito & Annette Lareau, School Selection as a Process: The Multiple Dimensions
of Race in Framing Educational Choice, 46 SOC. PROBS. 418, 424 (1999); Susan L. DeJarnatt, School
Choice and the (Ir)rational Parent, 15 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 1, 17–19 (2008).
49
See generally Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925) (holding that an Oregon
statute requiring children to attend public school was unconstitutional); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205, 235–36 (1972) (holding that Amish parents were not required to send their children to public
school past the eighth grade).
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more highly educated are more likely to have a ‘privatized’ conception of
schooling for children, in which school choices depends more heavily on personal or family self-interest rather than public or communal goods . . . .” 50
Scaffolded by Court decisions that affirm the moral and legal right of parents
to make schooling decisions with little regard for the broader public-school
system, a commitment to school choice now animates increasing political and
social support for charter schools and state-funded vouchers that parents can
use at private institutions. 51 The prioritization of the private choices of powerful white parents continues apace in more recent school desegregation cases,
where any attempts to curtail those choices is characterized as reverse discrimination in violation of equal protection principles. 52 These market-inspired educational norms, however, aggravate school segregation by race. 53
These obstacles to integration are distinct from displays of animus, which
feature intentional attempts to target a disfavored group. Nor are these obsta50
Sikkink & Emerson, supra note 25, at 273; see also Charles R. Lawrence III, Forbidden Conversations: On Race, Privacy, and Community (A Continuing Conversation with John Ely on Racism
and Democracy), 114 YALE L.J. 1353, 1385 (2005) (suggesting that parents often “do not think of
themselves as engaging in white flight or participating in the creation of communities that exclude and
demean blacks,” but rather “almost always act not because of enmity toward or disregard for others’
children but because of deep love and concern for [their] own”).
51
School choice programs, particularly in the form of charter schools, have continued to spread
over the last thirty years. From the endorsement of everyone from celebrities, to civil rights entities, to
education scholars, school choice programs—anchored in market principles—have become a staple
feature of education reform. Even the purportedly progressive Obama administration, for example,
prominently featured Race to the Top in its school reform policies. Race to the Top was “a federal
competition that award[ed] funding on the basis of the adoption of articulated guidelines.” Osamudia
R. James, Opt-Out Education: School Choice as Racial Subordination, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1083, 1097
(2014). Notably, “one guideline in particular awarded 40 out of a possible 500 points for states” that
promoted conditions conducive to the creation of highly effective charters schools. See id. at 1097–
1100 (canvassing the endorsement of celebrities such as John Legend in charter schools, the investment of civil rights organizations like the NAACP in charter school establishment, and the resignation
of scholars who research the realities of school choice implementation).
52
See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 747–48
(2007) (holding that a school assignment decision based on a student’s race is unconstitutional).
53
See Tim Walker, Racial Isolation of Charter School Students Exacerbating Resegregation,
NEA (May 4, 2018), https://www.nea.org/advocating-for-change/new-from-nea/racial-isolation-charterschool-students-exacerbating [https://perma.cc/T345-R9NC] (reporting that “[c]harter schools are
among the most racially segregated in the nation”); see also ERICA FRANKENBERG, GENEVIEVE
SIEGEL-HAWLEY & JIA WANG, THE C.R. PROJECT, CHOICE WITHOUT EQUITY: CHARTER SCHOOL
SEGREGATION AND THE NEED FOR CIVIL RIGHTS STANDARDS 4 (2010), https://www.civilrights
project.ucla.edu/research/k-12-education/integration-and-diversity/choice-without-equity-2009report/frankenberg-choices-without-equity-2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/N8F6-8VMG] (discussing that
“charter schools are more racially isolated than . . . public schools” in the U.S.); James, supra note 51,
at 1104–05 (reviewing how “[i]nformation asymmetry and unequal bargaining power also undermine
the market for parents of color”); Shelley McDonough Kimelberg & Chase M. Billingham, Attitudes
Toward Diversity and the School Choice Process: Middle-Class Parents in a Segregated Urban Public School District, 48 URB. EDUC. 198, 201–02 (2012) (finding that the process by which white parents select schools may contribute to an increase in racial segregation across districts).

212

Boston College Law Review

[Vol. 63:199

cles marked by purposeful attempts to distribute material resources for education differentially. Rather, built-in structural inequalities operate as a backdrop
for the choices that parents make on an education market facilitated by the
state. Although no less harmful than schooling segregation animated by intentional discrimination, these inequality-affirming choices are beyond the reach
of equality jurisprudence, and mark an unwieldy phase in the pursuit of educational equality.
B. Marriage
Like education, the institution of marriage is also understood to provide a
number of societal benefits, from “facilitate[ing] property transfers at death,”
to serving as “the site [for] essential reproductive tasks,” to addressing “dependency and vulnerability of [family] members.” 54 The Court has also affirmed marriage’s dignitary benefits, benefits that might be understood “as a
practice of national citizenship.” 55
Some scholars argue that by promoting the specialization of household
labor, marriages provide an economic benefit in efficiency desired by those
who agree to marry. 56 Others, still, note that married people enjoy better mental and physical health outcomes, 57 or that a public goods conception of marriage justifies evidentiary marital privileges. 58 This public goods conception of
54
Martha Albertson Fineman, Why Marriage?, 9 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & LAW 239, 242–43 (2001).
Marriage ultimately functions as part of a larger architecture of privatization in which “private norm
creation and private decision making” replace state governance of matters relating to the family. Jana
B. Singer, The Privatization of Family Law, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1443, 1444–45. In the process, dependency is privatized as adults provide care for children and each other, sometimes absent adequate
support from the state. See Melissa Murray, Family Law’s Doctrines, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1985, 2012–
17 (2015) (arguing that inconsistent case law is made more coherent when understood as the state’s
attempt to maintain the family’s role in privatizing dependency). But see Courtney G. Joslin, Family
Support and Supporting Families, 68 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 153, 164–65 (2015), https://wp0.
vanderbilt.edu/lawreview-new/wp-content/uploads/sites/278/2015/04/Family-Support-and-SupportingFamilies.pdf [https://perma.cc/6KYZ-Q352] (arguing that a default rule in presumption of family care
“is not necessarily a bad thing”—assuming caregivers have adequate support, “[f]amily members are
often best positioned” to offer care, people often “prefer to be cared for by a family member,” and
family care “strengthens and stabilizes those relationships” (footnote omitted)).
55
Angela P. Harris, Loving Before and After the Law, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2821, 2821–22
(2008).
56
See Erez Aloni, Incrementalism, Civil Unions, and the Possibility of Predicting Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage, 18 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 105, 150 (2010) (assessing the strength
of the argument that marriage provides an economic benefit).
57
See John G. Culhane, Beyond Rights and Morality: The Overlooked Public Health Argument
for Same-Sex Marriage, 17 TUL. J.L. & SEXUALITY 7, 24–34 (2008) (canvassing the work of marriage
equality opponents to present the public health benefits of marriage).
58
See I. Bennett Capers, Enron, DOMA, and Spousal Privileges: Rethinking the Marriage Plot,
81 FORDHAM L. REV. 715, 721–22 (2012) (detailing the public good of domestic and marital tranquility that justifies evidentiary privileges for married couples). But see Trina Jones, Single and Childfree!
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marriage is reflected in one scholar’s description of marriage laws as “public
packages of goods and services that [jurisdictions can use to] compete[]
against the public goods of other jurisdictions for the loyalty and the tax dollars of a mobile citizenry.” 59
That public and private goods run through marriage is no accident. Rather, marriage functions as an “exclusive path to . . . social and economic citizenship,” bestowing on married heterosexual couples exclusive benefits ostensibly intended “to promote traditional family” values and discourage “illicit
sex[].” 60 The result is that marriage has become “both a privileged status and a
status of the privileged,” 61 maintaining a gap between those who can access
marriage and those who cannot or will not. 62
Despite its benefits, marriage, too, has a history of restricted access. In the
1986 decision of Bowers v. Hardwick, the Court held that anti-sodomy statutes
did not violate the fundamental rights of gay men and lesbian women. 63 After
this decision, gay rights advocates sought to alter the legal status of sexual orientation and sexuality at the state court and legislative level. 64 This did not,
however, pave the way for same-sex marriage. At the state-level, same-sex
marriage advocacy fell into a pattern of state constitutional victories followed
by legislative “backlashes that ultimately qualified the gains.” 65
In Hawaii, after advocates secured a state supreme court ruling that the
state’s marriage law prohibiting same-sex marriage was unconstitutional, “voters amended the state constitution . . . [to] reaffirm[] the traditional definition
of marriage.” 66 After a Vermont Supreme Court ruling “barred the state from
restricting the public benefits of marriage only to opposite-sex couples,” the
legislature chose to permit same-sex couples to claim benefits through civilReassessing Parental and Marital Status Discrimination, 46 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1253, 1309–13 (2014)
(arguing that the public health benefits of marriage are debatable, noting that the social functions of
marriage are tempered given “shifting societal mores” about sex and economic and labor independence for women outside of the home, and suggesting that the social goods the state distributes through
marriage could be offered through alternate mechanisms that do not privilege marriage).
59
Martha C. Nussbaum, A Right to Marry?, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 667, 676–77 (2010) (quoting
HENDRIK HARTOG, MAN AND WIFE IN AMERICA: A HISTORY 14 (2000)).
60
Serena Mayeri, Marital Supremacy and the Constitution of the Nonmarital Family, 103 CALIF.
L. REV. 1277, 1343, 1351 (2015).
61
Id. at 1283.
62
For more on declining marriage trends and the underlying economic factors, see generally
JUNE CARBONE & NAOMI CAHN, MARRIAGE MARKETS: HOW INEQUALITY IS REMAKING THE AMERICAN FAMILY (2014).
63
478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
64
Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Sexual Politics and Social Change, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1523, 1528–
30 (2009).
65
David. D. Meyer, Fragmentation and Consolidation in the Law of Marriage and Same-Sex
Relationships, 58 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 115, 118–22 (2010).
66
Id. at 118–19.
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unions rather than extend access to marriage. 67 New Jersey followed suit with
similar legislation shortly thereafter. 68 Ultimately, a patchwork of marriageequivalents sprung up, granting same-sex couples domestic partnership or civil
union status across the country, including in Connecticut, New Hampshire, Nevada, Oregon, Washington, the District of Columbia, California, Maryland,
Maine, Wisconsin, and other state and local jurisdictions. 69
Even though these alternate arrangements were not marriage, Congress
nevertheless took additional steps to limit access to matrimony. In response to
the potential of same-sex marriage in Hawaii, Congress passed the Defense of
Marriage Act (DOMA). Adopted in 1996, DOMA affirmed the power of states
to refuse recognition of same-sex marriages created in other states and declared that for all purposes of federal law, the term “marriage” would be limited to opposite-sex couples. 70 DOMA would come to precede a broad national
commitment to denying same-sex couples access to marriage. After Lawrence
v. Texas decriminalized same-sex intimacy, public support for same-sex marriage nevertheless plummeted. 71 By 2012, approximately forty states deemed
same-sex marriage unlawful, with thirty-one of such states doing so by way of
amendment to their state constitution. 72
Like education, denied or differential access to marriage can be costly.73
Litigation in United States v. Windsor, for example, was prompted by Edith
Windsor’s inability “to claim the estate tax exemption for surviving spouses.”74
Id. at 119.
Id. at 119–20.
69
Id. at 120–22.
70
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003); see also Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 67–68
(Haw. 1993) (holding that denying same-sex couples marriage licenses was discrimination based on
sex, requiring strict scrutiny review), abrogated by Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015); Steve
Sanders, Dignity and Social Meaning: Obergefell, Windsor, and Lawrence as Constitutional Dialogue, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 2069, 2085 (2019) (noting that Baehr v. Lewin “set off a rapid series of
‘backlash measures,’” with “DOMA . . . characterized by blunt anti-gay [rhetoric]” (quoting Jane S.
Schacter, Courts and the Politics of Backlash: Marriage Equality Litigation, Then and Now, 82 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1153, 1154 (2009))); Meyer, supra note 65, at 126–32 (discussing some states’ continued oppostion to same-sex marriage following the Lawrence v. Texas decision).
71
The majority in Lawrence v. Texas took pains to explain that their decriminalization of sodomy
did not imply “a right to legal recognition of [same-sex marriage].” See Hutchinson, supra note 64, at
1530–32 (2009) (discussing the Lawrence v. Texas opinion and its aftermath). See generally Lawrence
539 U.S. at 578 (holding anti-sodomy statute in Texas as unconstitutional, as the statute interfered
with same-sex couples’ right to privacy).
72
Sanders, supra note 70, at 2086.
73
Denied access to marriage, of course, is not the exclusive province of same-sex marriage bans.
Rather, scholars have documented how changes in the American economy have prompted declines in
the marriage rate depending on class, rendering marriage an elusive or undesirable status given economic instability. For more on the impact on growing inequality on the rate of marriage, see generally
CARBONE & CAHN, supra note 62.
74
570 U.S. 744, 750–51 (2013).
67
68
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Although the state of New York recognized Windsor’s marriage to her partner,
DOMA precluded same-sex partners from claiming the exemption. 75 In declaring DOMA unconstitutional, the Court in Windsor noted that DOMA “raises
the cost of health care for families by taxing health benefits provided by employers to their workers’ same-sex spouses. And it denies or reduces benefits
allowed to families upon the loss of a spouse and parent, benefits that are an
integral part of family security.” 76 Additional material penalties imposed under
DOMA included the inability to collect social security payments for a spouse,
which can “be as much as $25,000 a year,” and higher Medicare premiums in
the absence of jointly-filed taxes. 77 Ultimately, DOMA controlled laws pertaining to social security, retirement, housing, criminal sanctions, copyright and
veterans benefits, all to significant and negative financial consequence. The
2013 and 2015 respective Supreme Court cases of Windsor and Obergefell v.
Hodges were major pronouncements in the fight for marriage equality. 78 In
Windsor, the Supreme Court struck down DOMA, concluding it sought to injure the class of same-sex couples seeking to marry, an expression of animus
that also contravened proper deference to states in the regulation of marriage. 79
Two years later, in Obergefell, the Court concluded that the Constitution protected the right of same-sex couples to marry, and that laws otherwise preventing those unions denied same-sex couples due process and equal protection of
the laws. 80 Together, these cases made marriage equality the law of the land.
Nonetheless like education, major judicial pronouncements were not the last
word.
Rather, a new front has opened in the battle for gay rights. In 2012,
cakeshop owner Jack Phillips denied service to a same-sex couple celebrating
their wedding and subsequently requested an exemption from the Colorado
public accommodations law that would otherwise require him to serve the
couple. 81 Phillips maintained that as a devout Christian, making a cake for a
same-sex couple would contradict his religious convictions. 82 Phillips further
argued that his refusal was a rejection of the act of same-sex marriage, and not
75

Id.
Id. at 773 (citation omitted).
77
Janna Herron, DOMA: The Cost of Being Gay and Married, FOX BUS., https://www.fox
business.com/features/doma-the-cost-of-being-gay-and-married [https://perma.cc/3PZW-WA94] (Mar.
5, 2016).
78
See generally Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015) (holding that same-sex couples have
a right to marry under the Constitution); Windsor, 570 U.S. at 775 (holding the Defense of Marriage
Act (DOMA) unconstitutional).
79
570 U.S. at 775.
80
576 U.S. at 672.
81
Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 2015 COA 115, ¶¶ 1, 3, rev’d sub nom., Masterpiece
Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018).
82
Id. at ¶¶ 3–4.
76
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of gays and lesbians themselves. 83 Following appeal to the Supreme Court,
Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, in 2018, in Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado
Civil Rights Commission, avoided the collision of equal protection and free
exercise the case presented by concluding that the Commission exhibited “hostility to a religion.” 84
Lest one believe the Court’s decision in Masterpiece Cakeshop is the end
of this inquiry, a legal challenge in Arlene’s Flowers v. Washington was
brought before the Supreme Court of Washington. 85 In light of a similar fact
pattern to Masterpiece Cakeshop, the Court remanded the plaintiffs’ petition
for state Supreme Court certiorari review. On remand, the Supreme Court of
Washington held that the plaintiff shop owner had, “[b]y refusing to provide
[custom floral arrangements] for a same-sex wedding, . . . discriminated on the
basis of ‘sexual orientation’” under state law. 86 The court also held that the
state’s action against her for violations of the state’s anti-discriminatory laws
did not “violate[] First Amendment protections against ‘compelled speech’”
nor the shop owner’s “First Amendment right to religious free exercise.” 87 Despite this ruling, the plaintiff again requested certiorari review, which the
Court ultimately denied. 88
Public accommodations challenges like these are a new stage in the debate about the meaning of equality not just for same-sex couples, but for the
LGBTQ community overall. Like in education, the challenges are grounded in
the voluntary choices of individuals that are either beyond the reach of the law
or not easily resolved by our current legal frameworks. Both contexts, moreo83
Id. at ¶ 25. Some scholars suggest that grounding opposition in conduct, rather than in a rejection of gays and lesbians themselves, is the latest iteration of an old strategy championed by the religious right over the past seventy years to link LGBTQ people to undesirable behaviors, thus justifying
discrimination on the basis of conduct rather than individual status. See generally Kyle C. Velte, Why
the Religious Right Can’t Have Its (Straight Wedding) Cake and Eat It Too: Breaking the Preservation-Through-Transformation Dynamic in Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, 36 MINN. J. L. & INEQ. 67 (2018) (identifying this strategy as animating both pre-Lawrence
sodomy laws as well as attacks on same-sex marriage based on purported harm to children subject to
those marriages). Litigants’ responses to conduct, therefore, are expressions of speech, pitting freedom
of religion claims against equal protection claims, and justifying private discrimination against gays
and lesbians based on religious beliefs. Terri R. Day & Danielle Weatherby, Contemplating Masterpiece Cakeshop, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 86, 88–89 (2017), https://scholarlycommons.
law.wlu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1084&context=wlulr-online [https://perma.cc/Z3UP-ECGR].
84
138 S. Ct. at 1731.
85
Id.; State v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., 389 P.3d 543, 548–550 (Wash. 2017), vacated and remanded mem., 138 S. Ct. 2671 (2018).
86
State v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., 441 P.3d 1203, 1220–22 (Wash. 2019), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct.
2884 (2021).
87
Id. at 1224–29.
88
See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i–ii, Arlene’s Flowers, Inc. v. Washington, 441 P.3d
1203 (Wash. 2019), (No. 19-333), 2019 WL 4413355, at *i–ii, cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 2884 (2021)
(requesting Supreme Court review).
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ver, reflect problems of status: the capacity of education and marriage to embody social status, the capacity of broadened access to both social goods to
disrupt status hierarchies, and the capacity of status challenges to evade legal
resolution, even when they implicate inequality.
II. STATUS IN EQUALITY MOVEMENTS
Due to the “fundamental equality of legal and political rights” in societies
like the United States, explicit claims to superiority and inferiority are not typically made public; rather, status assumes a more informal nature. 89 The informality, however, of commitments to status hierarchy undercuts neither its existence nor its force. To the contrary, status operates at the “level of everyday
social relations” and is deeply embedded in the fabric of American life. 90
To the extent that status is inherently about relative social positioning, we
would naturally expect status to be implicated in the adversarial context of the
law and litigation regarding access to societal goods and rewards. Nineteenth
century slave doctrine, the abolition of slavery, and Jim Crow laws are all examples of the law working either to dismantle or maintain status markers. 91
Further, law can reflect commitments to one’s way of life, which include political, social, and religious beliefs. 92 When legal battles implicate these beliefs—
think conception as the start of life in battles over abortion, or as a commitment to race neutrality in challenges to affirmative action policies—groups on
either side of the conflict stake a claim, working to preserve or improve their
group’s status as enshrined in the commitments animating the legal challenge. 93 Because status is maintained through exclusionary practices, legal battles over who has access to which benefits, and in which form, will implicate
status issues that are not easily resolved. 94 Section A of this Part provides an
89
Tak Wing Chan & John H. Goldthorpe, Class and Status: The Conceptual Distinction and Its
Empirical Relevance, 72 AM. SOCIO. REV. 512, 515 (2007).
90
See Cecilia L. Ridgeway, Why Status Matters for Inequality, 79 AM. SOCIO. REV. 1, 12 (2014)
(explaining that “mutually sustaining” macro and micro systems of inequality make it particularly
difficult to address inequality effectively).
91
Balkin, supra note 5, at 2325–27. Even legal decisions that seem explicitly to dismantle status
hierarchies can be informed by enduring commitments to status inequality. Plessy v. Ferguson, for
example, involved rules about segregation of public accommodations, but also reflected commitments
and perceptions regarding the social status of whites relative to Blacks. In his dissent, Justice Harlan
commits to a colorblind principle not because he is racially progressive, but because he believes that
equal standing for whites and Blacks before the law does not threaten the dominant social status of
whites in society. Id. at 2329–30; see also Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552–64 (1896) (Harlan,
J., dissenting), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
92
Balkin, supra note 5, at 2327–28.
93
Id. at 2331–33.
94
Chan & Goldthorpe, supra note 89, at 512; see also Balkin, supra note 5, at 2328 (“[C]onflicts
for increased social status often overlap with struggles for other social goods. . . . [Status competition]
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overview of status and distinctions between challenges to status, discrimination, and animus. 95 Section B follows with a discussion regarding the role of
status in equality movements, specifically in the context of public school integration and same-sex marriage. 96
A. Social Status
Access to social goods or benefits does not exclusively dictate an individual’s status but can operate to enhance or buttress status. Access can also serve as
conduits of power or material resources which work in conjunction with status to
secure a stratification system. 97 Although distinct from competition for material
resources or animus, status often overlaps with both in matters of equality.
1. The Architecture of Status
Equality progress in the United States is subject to a status-based hierarchy which confers differing levels of esteem on groups according to their position in the social order. Status is ultimately about how groups and their comprising individuals are valued by society. In this system, social groups are
ranked and organized by legal, political, and cultural criteria. 98 “Inherently
multi-level,” these hierarchies create claims to esteem in terms of positive or
negative privileges, 99 distinguishing between individuals and groups on the
basis of honor, influence, and value. 100 For status to function, stereotypes and
is a means for groups that have previously held lower status to raise their social esteem, and gain other
potential advantages that higher status normally confers.”).
95
See infra notes 97–136 and accompanying text.
96
See infra notes 137–213 and accompanying text.
97
See, e.g., Stuart J. Hysom, Status Valued Goal Objects and Performance Expectations, 87 SOC.
FORCES 1623, 1623 (2009) (testing and confirming “predictions, derived from expectation states theories, that the unequal allocation of social rewards among collective task-focused actors will affect the
actors’ rates of power and prestige behavior”); see also Stuart J. Hysom, Murray Webster, Jr. & Lisa
Slattery Walker, Expectations, Status Value, and Group Structure, 58 SOCIO. PERSPS. 554, 554 (2015)
(testing and confirming the theory that “both the status positions of actors and the status value of their
rewards function in status generalization”).
98
Vasiliki Kantzara, Status, in THE BLACKWELL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOCIOLOGY 4757, 4757–60
(George Rizter ed., 2007).
99
Ridgeway, supra note 90, at 5. See generally MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE SOCIOLOGY 305 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., University of California Press 1978) (1968) (discussing the multi-level hierarchy structure of status and how positive or
negative privileges impact their esteem).
100
Ridgeway, supra note 90, at 5. Sociologists have concluded that there is also something of a
moral element to beliefs about status and worthiness. See Feng Bai, Beyond Dominance and Competence: A Moral Virtue Theory of Status Attainment, 21 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. REV. 203, 203
(2017) (proposing a “moral virtue theory” of status by which “acts of virtue elicit feelings of warmth
and admiration (for virtue), and willing deference, toward the virtuous actor”); see also Oliver Hahl,
Ezra W. Zuckerman & Minjae Kim, Why Elites Love Authentic Lowbrow Culture: Overcoming High-
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status beliefs about groups must be consensual such that virtually everyone in
a society shares them as cultural knowledge about what “most people
think.” 101
We can consider neither wealth (resources) nor power (control over resources) without properly understanding that the differential distribution of
honor, esteem, and respect by status not only co-constitutes resources and
power, but also acts as an independent dimension of inequality in the United
States. 102 In contrast to resources and power (which are informed by “material
arrangements”), status is anchored in cultural beliefs about which groups are
“better,” and thus is relational in nature; status “shap[es] people’s expectations
for themselves and others.” 103 Whereas wealth and power are taken and possessed, status is conferred and given. 104
Nominal characteristics—“socially recognized attribute[s] on which people are perceived to differ” categorically––can form the basis by which people
distinguish between “better” and “worse” groups. 105 Status beliefs with the
“most general implications for inequality are those that link a group difference
. . . [to] competence”; these “diffuse status characteristics . . . make[] such staStatus Denigration with Outsider Art, 82 AM. SOCIO. REV. 828, 828 (2017) (“[D]evelop[ing] and
test[ing] the idea that public appreciation for authentic lowbrow cultures affords an effective way for
certain elites to address feelings of authenticity-insecurity arising from ‘high status denigration . . . .’”
(citation omitted)); Oliver Hahl & Ezra W. Zuckerman, The Denigration of Heroes? How the Status
Attainment Process Shapes Attributions of Considerateness and Authenticity, 120 AM. J. SOCIOLOGY.
504, 504 (2014) (theorizing that a “common tendency” to suspect “high-status actors” as “inconsiderate and inauthentic relative to low-status counterparts” arguably “reflect[s] two conditions typical of
status attainment processes: (a) assertions of superiority over others and (b) the presence of incentives
to pursue status”).
101
See Cecilia L. Ridgeway & Shelley J. Correll, Consensus and the Creation of Status Beliefs,
85 SOC. FORCES 431, 432–34 (2006) [hereinafter Ridgeway & Correll, Consensus and the Creation of
Status Beliefs] (articulating and testing the theory that the “appearance of consensus” is key in explaining how “categorical differences” among human groups become the foundations on which “status
beliefs [are developed]”); see also Ridgeway, supra note 90, at 5 (discussing status beliefs at the macro and micro level). This does not mean that everybody necessarily internalizes these beliefs, but rather that most people, even those disadvantaged by these beliefs, knows what the beliefs are, accept as
social fact how groups are evaluated relative to each other, and expect others will treat them in accordance with the beliefs. Shelley J. Correll & Cecilia L. Ridgeway, Expectation States Theory, in
HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 29, 32 (John Delamater ed., 2003) [hereinafter Correll &
Ridgeway, Expectation States Theory].
102
Ridgeway, supra note 90, at 3. For inequality to become durable, “control over resources . . .
has to be consolidated” on the basis of differences between groups of people. Id. This consolidation
“transforms . . . situational control over resources and power into a status difference between “‘types’
of people,” such that “people quickly link the appearance of mastery” in a social setting to superiority
in that setting. Id.
103
Id.
104
RIDGEWAY, supra note 19, at 21–22.
105
Cecilia Ridgeway, The Social Construction of Status Value: Gender and Other Nominal
Characteristics, 70 SOC. FORCES 367, 368 (1991); RIDGEWAY, supra note 19, at 77.
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tus beliefs [about an individual’s competence] relevant . . . across a wide variety of tasks and contexts.” 106 Therefore, others expect members of high-status
groups to be “better” at a number of things compared to members of lowerstatus groups. 107
“[E]thnicity, race, and gender are all nominal characteristics” in the United States shaped by cultural beliefs suggesting “that persons who have one
state of the characteristic . . . are more worthy in . . . society than those with
another state of the characteristic.” 108 For example, two widely held assumptions are that it is more worthy or valuable to be male instead of female, or
white rather than Black. 109 Of course, nominal characteristics are also intersectional, and any one person possesses more than one “socially significant attribute”; nevertheless, characteristics do “disaggregate[] into separate status dimensions” based on “our consensual cultural beliefs about [those attributes].” 110 These “beliefs are hegemonic,” reflected and entrenched “in the media, [law and] government policy,” and function as “normative images” of
groups. 111
RIDGEWAY, supra note 19, at 77.
Id.
108
Ridgeway, supra note 105, at 368. These “can be distinguished from graduated characteristics
such as wealth or education,” the value of which is determined by “the degree to which [people] possess the characteristic.” Id.; see Tiffany A. Ito & Geoffrey R. Urland, Race and Gender on the Brain:
Electrocortical Measures of Attention to the Race and Gender of Multiply Categorizable Individuals,
85 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 616, 622 (2003) (providing evidence to suggest “that when perceivers encounter multiply categorizable individuals, race and gender information are . . . [cognitively] activated at very early stages in processing”); see also Kerri L. Johnson, Jonathan B. Freeman &
Kristin Pauker, Race Is Gendered: How Covarying Phenotypes and Stereotypes Bias Sex Categorization, 102 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 116, 116 (2012) (“[C]halleng[ing] the notion that social
categories are perceived independent of one another and show[ing], instead,” through “common facial
phenotypes” and “shared stereotypes,” that “race is gendered.”). See generally Marilynn B. Brewer &
Layton N. Lui, The Primacy of Age and Sex in the Structure of Person Categories, 7 SOC. COGNITION
262 (1989) (confirming the prevalence of “age and gender classifications” as “superordinate social
categories” on which humans draw distinctions).
109
Ridgeway, supra note 105, at 368; see also Paul Gowder, Racial Classification and Ascriptive
Injury, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 325, 328 (2014) (describing a racial hierarchy in the United States in
which Blacks are at the bottom); Laurie T. O’Brien & Brenda Major, System-Justifying Beliefs and
Psychological Well-Being: The Roles of Group Status and Identity, 31 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH.
BULL. 1718, 1720 (2005) (categorizing “Latinos and Blacks as low-status ethnic groups, and Whites
as a high-status ethnic group”); Cecilia L. Ridgeway & Shelley J. Correll, Unpacking the Gender
System: A Theoretical Perspective on Gender Beliefs and Social Relations, 18 GENDER & SOC’Y 510,
513 (2004) (explaining that “[m]en are viewed as more status worthy and competent overall and more
competent at the things that ‘count most’”).
110
Ridgeway, supra note 105, at 368.
111
See Ridgeway & Correll, supra note 109, at 513 (describing the process of beliefs becoming
institutionalized as applied to gender). Alternative belief systems can, however, “exist . . . along[side]
. . . hegemonic beliefs. See id. at 514 (noting that in African American communities, “women are seen
as more competent relative to men,” and that the “modern-day girl power movement is . . . an attempt
to . . . reduc[e] the differentiation between girls and boys”).
106
107

2022]

Relational Obstacles in the Law to Racial Justice and LGBTQ Equality

221

The cultural anchors for status hierarchy, however, are not foregone conclusions. Although research suggests that human predisposition to status hierarchies has evolutionary roots, as sociologist Cecilia Ridgeway explains, the
basic “norm[] for status allocation . . . acts as the social grammar for status
relations.” 112 Culturally informed status beliefs, which are “less normative,
more descriptive, and historically changing . . . provide the vocabulary by
which [the] grammar is [deployed] to create hierarchies.” 113
Political, economic, or social change can undermine the status positions
of established groups, prompting resistance. Indeed, the impulse of high-status
groups to defend their position in the hierarchy is a key way in which status
distinctions are made material; when members of lower-status groups “challenge the status hierarchy, they frequently encounter a hostile backlash . . .
from high-status others.” 114 Distinct from unconscious biases benefitting favored groups in society, “defense of the status hierarchy” prompts intentional
action designed to reign in “lower status individuals who are perceived to ‘go
too far.’” 115 Research suggests, for example, “that whites’ perceptions of challenges to their racial status . . . [prompt] resistance” in the form of “increase[d]
. . . support for political organizations they perceive as upholding the traditional racial hierarchy.” 116
The science, however, is not all grim. Cultural beliefs informing status hierarchies, and that give status meaning, can be eroded through “two interrelated processes”: first, “by undermining [the] perceived consensuality” of the
underlying cultural beliefs; and second, by “narrowing the competence differences” that status beliefs signal. 117 Because status hierarchies are perpetuated
by the common perception that most people share these beliefs, providing
counter-beliefs and opportunities for interactions that challenge the veracity of
those beliefs are both instrumental in eroding status. 118
112
See RIDGEWAY, supra note 19, at 21–28, 151 (canvassing dominance and prestige theories as
evidence of the evolutionary origins of status).
113
Id. at 151.
114
Id. at 159; Ridgeway, supra note 90, at 7.
115
Ridgeway, supra note 90, at 7.
116
See id. at 11–12 (discussing experiments conducted by prominent researchers, such as Willer,
Feinberg, and Wetts). Social dominance orientation theory further suggests “that those with higher
levels of social dominance orientation prefer more hierarchical social relationships” and “those in high
status positions or those in positions that are hierarchy enhancing . . . are likely to exhibit greater social dominance orientation in contrast to those in subordinate positions or those in positions that are
more hierarchy attenuating.” Nancy DiTomaso, Corinne Post & Rochelle Parks-Yancy, Workforce
Diversity and Inequality: Power, Status, and Numbers, 33 ANN. REV. SOCIOLOGY 473, 479 (2007).
117
Ridgeway, supra note 19, at 162–63.
118
Id.; see also Ridgeway & Correll, Consensus and the Creation of Status Beliefs, supra note
101, at 431 (finding that even “slight challenges to . . . influence hierarchies” that were “developed
between categorically different actors . . . broke the validating consensus,” resulting in “significantly
weaker and less clear” status beliefs among participants).
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2. Discrimination, Animus, Status
It can be difficult to separate the impetus of status from the impetus of animus or competing claims to resources in equality movements and litigation.
Described by the Supreme Court as a “desire to harm a politically unpopular
group,” 119 animus is about targeting and “burden[ing] out-groups simply because of who they are.” 120 Whether the subjective expression of legislators,121
or their response to feelings expressed by their constituents, 122 a legislative
intent to harm a politically unpopular group is an impermissible legislative
function. In contrast, status is not about burdening or stigmatizing an outgroup,
as much as it is about relative feelings between groups of worth and value.
Groups with lower status can encounter animus on account of their subordinate
positioning, but the consolidation and affirmation of status does not necessarily
involve the targeting of out groups.
Discrimination is the alternate lens through which inequality is assessed
in law. Antidiscrimination commitments are made manifest through equal protection jurisprudence and federal (and state) antidiscrimination statutes. 123 Under Equal Protection doctrine, governmental classifications that treat people
differently according to factors like race and ethnicity, gender, and non-marital
parentage, are interrogated according to tiered levels of scrutiny. Judicial solicitude for these groups is based on their “histor[ies] of purposeful unequal
treatment,” their relegation to a “position of political powerlessness as to
command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process,”
and the “obvious, immutable, or distinguishing characteristics that define them
as a discrete group.” 124
Like animus, discrimination can also be difficult to isolate from status as
an obstruction to equality. Disparities in public education, for example, endure
in part because of school financing schemes that allow some wealthier school

119
See U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973) (declaring the “congressional
desire to harm a politically unpopular group . . . a[n] [il]legitimate governmental interest.” (emphasis
omitted)).
120
See WILLIAM D. ARAIZA, ANIMUS: A SHORT INTRODUCTION TO BIAS IN THE LAW 4 (2017).
121
Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534.
122
See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 438 (1985) (finding it illegitimate for legislators to use legislation to express the prejudice of their constituents).
123
Title VII is the major federal antidiscrimination statute, barring employer discrimination
against an employee on the basis of “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” Civil Rights Act of
1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
124
Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 601–03 (1987) (quoting Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638
(1986)); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973); see also Jessica Knouse,
From Identity Politics to Ideology Politics, 2009 UTAH L. REV. 749, 776–77 n.120 (noting that suspect class status has typically been extended to “racially premised groups”).
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districts to amass and hoard resources relative to poorer districts. 125 Moreover,
the resistance of some school districts in response to school finance equalization initiatives that can close funding gaps serve as case studies in the potency
of discrimination in the distribution of resources as a driver of inequality. 126
Beliefs about the worthiness of particular neighborhoods and districts defined by reference to race also animate and justify resource disparities. That is,
people accept not only resource deficits in non-white school districts, but also
wealth and surplus in white districts as a function of the perceived merit, worthiness, and esteem of the racial groups that populate these regions. 127 For example, today’s school financing system, through which individual school districts are funded primarily via local taxes, is a product of the separate tax systems implemented after the Civil War “to enable segregated schooling in the
North and South”; one hundred fifty years later, these same systems were continued in “color-blind” fashion, “facilitating . . . de facto segregate[ion]” and
maintaining resource disparities between white and non-white districts. 128
Nevertheless, they are anchored in original status beliefs that assigned differ125
In the United States, school districts are funded by local taxes. Thus, the wealth of a district’s
tax base determines that district’s ability to fund its schools. Although state equalization formulas are
sometimes adopted to supplement funding for poorer school districts, these efforts typically go only so
far in ensuring that minimum education needs are met. Not only do poor localities have a shallow tax
base from which to pull, in many urban districts, the existence of nonprofit institutions further limit
school funding. Furthermore, state constitutional caps on tax sometimes make it impossible for poorer
districts, if they were so inclined, to tax themselves at a higher capacity to produce more funding. As a
result, some “school districts bec[o]me enclaves of affluence while others” are characterized as fiscally weak. KERN ALEXANDER & RICHARD G. SALMON, PUBLIC SCHOOL FINANCE 146 (1995). These
enclaves are often “adept in convincing legislatures that their advantageous position is . . . justified,”
producing a system in which wealthier districts are insulated, geographically defined districts protected by state legislatures that refuse to adopt equalization measures, and increasingly policed through
the criminalization of address fraud for purposes of enrollment. Id. at 18, 146–48; see also Peter Enrich, Leaving Equality Behind: New Directions in School Finance Reform, 48 VAND. L. REV. 100, 180
(1995) (arguing that adequacy rather than equality claims in school finance litigation are likely to be
more successful because they are least threatening to elites who “derive the greatest benefits from the
existing inequalities, because adequacy does not threaten their ability to retain a superior position”);
LaToya Baldwin Clark, Stealing Education, 68 UCLA L. REV. 566, 592–98 (2021) (documenting the
criminalization of residency fraud in school enrollment).
126
See, e.g., Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 6 (reversing a Texas district court ruling that a Texas public
school’s finance plan was unconstitutional).
127
See James E. Ryan, The Influence of Race in School Finance Reform, 98 MICH. L. REV. 432,
433–34 (1999) (discussing research studies suggesting the amount of support for school finance reform among whites “depended as much upon racial attitudes as it did upon self-interest,” and that
even “some whites whose school districts stood to gain from school finance reform opposed” it because of “their attitudes toward blacks”). See generally Baldwin Clark, supra note 125 (documenting
how school district boundaries, and the laws that criminalize address falsification in order for students
to matriculate in a different district, reflect cultural borders between districts, and the racialized beliefs
that those inside the district have about the merit and worth of those outside the district).
128
CAMILLE WALSH, RACIAL TAXATION: SCHOOLS, SEGREGATION, AND TAXPAYER CITIZENSHIP, 1869–1973, at 4 (2018).
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ing levels of esteem to white and non-white racial groups, and that continue to
track funding disparities today.
Similarly, in the 1973 case of San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez, plaintiffs brought suit alleging that school financing systems that
produced disparities between wealthy and poor schools were an equal protection violation. 129 Lead litigators purposely “avoided casting the Rodriguez case
as a ‘race’ case,” even as race dominated school equality litigation at the
time. 130 Race status was nonetheless salient in a case about resources given
that majority-minority districts generally enjoy less robust school funding than
their white counterparts. Edgewood district, from which the Rodriguez plaintiffs hailed, “was overwhelmingly Hispanic” relative to the “predominantly
white,” wealthier Alamo Heights district to which their suit drew comparison. 131 Ultimately, movements for education equality—particularly as litigated
during the twentieth-century civil rights movement—implicated animus,
claims to material resources that inform school financing, and, as will be discussed below, status claims about the dignity and value of Blacks relative to
whites.
In contrast, same-sex marriage potentially proves more useful for isolating the pull of status claims. Unlike education (the distribution of which is understood as zero-sum), extending marriage to same-sex couples did not require
opposite-sex couples to share materials or resources. Further, animus may have
been less central to the legal battles over same-sex marriage; despite potential
signs of social retrenchment regarding the LGBTQ community more generally, 132 public opinion in support of same-sex marriage was relatively high at the
time that legal barriers to same-sex marriage fell. 133 Similarly, recent attempts
to deny service to same-sex couples are anchored in plaintiffs’ claims of religious exercise—a key difference from the laws that previously targeted gays
129
411 U.S. at 5–6; Michael Heise, The Story of San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez: School Finance, Local Control, and Constitutional Limits, in EDUCATION LAW STORIES 51, 55
(Michael A. Olivas & Ronna Greff Schneider eds., 2008).
130
Heise, supra note 129, at 55.
131
See id.; Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 12–13.
132
In 2019, the Gay and Lesbian Alliance Against Defamation (GLAAD) administered “its fifth
annual Accelerating Acceptance Index.” Nadia Suleman, Young Americans Are Increasingly ‘Uncomfortable’ with LGBTQ Community, GLAAD Study Shows, TIME (June 25, 2019), https://time.com/
5613276/glaad-acceptance-index-lgbtq-survey/ [https://perma.cc/65P7-735H]. To GLAAD’s dismay,
the index documented a negative trend in LGBTQ acceptance: “‘The younger [millennial] generation
[which] has traditionally been thought of as a beacon of progressive values,’” were “becoming increasingly ‘uncomfortable’” in “more immediately ‘personal’” interactions with members of the
LGBTQ community. Id. (quoting a press release GLAAD issued with the Index). Furthermore, people
aged 18–34 “were the only demographic to see such a sharp decline in acceptance.” Id.
133
See supra note 8 and accompanying text (discussing changes in public support for same-sex
marriage following the Obergefell decision); see also Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 681 (2015)
(guaranteeing same-sex couples “the fundamental right to marry” under the Constitution).
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and lesbians as a class and provided the factual scenarios which formed the
Court’s animus jurisprudence. 134
It might be easier, then, to consider whether the more recent refusals of
bakers, florists, and even adoption agencies to serve same-sex couples reflects
resistance to engaging gays and lesbians fully as social peers, and as a sense of
social injury at the state’s insistence that they do. 135 One legal scholar has argued that the Court’s decision in Masterpiece Cakeshop suggests an “inversion
of animus”—a transformation of majority-plaintiffs into minorities who suddenly need the Court’s protection from subordination. 136 We might extend,
however, the reach of this scholar’s observations about inversion. That is, inversion describes not just the Court’s doctrinal maneuver, but also the positioning of plaintiffs in a social status hierarchy. Being required to serve same-sex
couples triggers plaintiffs’ concerns about status loss relative to same-sex couples whose status is rising as a consequence of access to marriage.
The impact of status on equality movements is often unaddressed, particularly in comparison to the engagement of animus and discrimination, two
phenomena about which cultural and legal norms of disapproval are more
firmly set. Although useful to consider in isolation, drawing sharp lines between animus, discrimination, and status is not necessarily the goal. Rather, the
goal is to recognize that status exerts a less visible, but forceful drag on equality movements, the recognition of which can reinvigorate the push for antisubordination or redistributive justice approaches to equality law, inform policy and law that accounts for its impact, and prompt a more clear-eyed assessment of the triumphs and failures of equality movements.

134
See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634–35 (1996) (striking down an amendment to the
Colorado Constitution that excluded same-sex relationships from serving as the basis of nondiscrimination claims because of an “inevitable inference” of animus); see also Kevin M. Barry, Brian
Farrell, Jennifer L. Levi & Neelima Vanguri, A Bare Desire to Harm: Transgender People and the
Equal Protection Clause, 57 B.C. L. REV. 507, 545–46 (2016) (discussing that “evidence of animus
can be either direct or indirect” and using Romer to illustrate how the Court “inferred animus from the
structure and practical effect of the challenged law”).
135
In June 2021, the Supreme Court decided Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, a case in which the
City of Philadelphia refused to use a taxpayer-funded, government-contracted foster care agency that
discriminated against prospective foster families on the basis of sexual orientation, claiming that to
license same-sex couples to foster would be contradictory to the agency’s religious beliefs. 141 S. Ct.
1868, 1874–75 (2021). The Court held that the city’s refusal to use the agency’s services because of
the agency’s policy against licensing same-sex couples to foster children was unconstitutional. Id. at
1882.
136
Melissa Murray, Inverted Animus: Masterpiece Cakeshop and the New Minorities, 2018 SUP.
CT. REV. 257, 259, 284; see Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719,
1731 (2018).
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B. Status in Movements
Both education and marriage function as valuable social goods, the distribution of which has maintained and symbolized status hierarchies. Through
legally-mandated segregated schooling and subsequent racialized disparities in
access, education has maintained the superordinate status of white people.
Similarly, tightly-drawn legal parameters regarding access to marriage has operated to serve and maintain the superordinate status of straight men and heterosexual couples in service of patriarchy.
The observation that the law has restricted access, operating to differentially grant access to goods like education and marriage, is not new. Less obvious are the ways that landmark equality cases that appear to dismantle status
hierarchy actually reinscribe it. Cultural beliefs inform and anchor status hierarchies; for status to function, stereotypes and beliefs about groups must be
consensual such that virtually everyone shares them as cultural knowledge. 137
“Undermining [the] perceived consensuality” of such beliefs is key to dismantling status. 138 The absence of serious engagement with status in litigation,
however, combined with rhetoric and language that reaffirms hierarchies of
value, serves only to more deeply entrench status in the long-term.
1. Public School Integration
More than just expressions of animus reserved for Black people, or the
monopoly of whites over educational resources, school segregation came to
reflect the superordinate social status of white people. Through substandard
facilities, sharply limited resources, and inferior educational opportunities, the
exclusion of Blacks from white schools operated within a closed system in
which closure conferred advantages on insiders—whites—while denying Blacks
access to those advantages. 139 Through racial exclusion and segregation, education has helped maintain the superordinate status of white Americans.
Segregated schools, however, also signaled the inferior status of Blacks,
using stigmatizing exclusion as a representation of their lower societal worth
and value. Like the anti-miscegenation laws that worked in conjunction with
school segregation, 140 de jure school segregation policies were meant not just
137
Ridgeway & Correll, Consensus and the Creation of Status Beliefs, supra note 101, at 434;
Ridgeway, supra note 90, at 2–3.
138
RIDGEWAY, supra note 19, at 162–63; see also supra note 118 and accompanying text (discussing how consensus lends to the foundation on which status beliefs are formed and aids in understanding how human groups are categorized).
139
See Jeremy Fiel, Closing Ranks: Closure, Status Competition, and School Segregation, 121
AM. J. SOCIOLOGY 126, 128 (2015) (explaining the concept of closure).
140
During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, “Jim Crow restrictions on [interracial]
marriage implemented the combined white supremacist and eugenicist ideologies of an innate racial
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to separate whites and Blacks, but to separate whites from Blacks. 141 The implication was that proximity to Blackness was degrading to superior white
identity, and white schools became symbols of that superiority. 142
Nor did public school integration decisively undercut the link between racialized school enrollment and status. Despite having dismantled explicit
markers of status hierarchy, the Brown litigation nevertheless worked to preserve superior white status. When the Court declared segregation as unconstitutional, for example, it focused on how segregation denied Black children
equal educational opportunities, and inflicted psychological harm: “To separate
[children in grade and high schools] from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their
status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.” 143 The Court did not, however, interrogate the commithierarchy that called for racial separation.” Dorothy E. Roberts, Loving v. Virginia as a Civil Rights
Decision, 59 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 175, 177 (2014–15). To maintain this racial distance, whites used
public school segregation “to prevent the development of sexual relationships between whites and
people of color,” and thus ensured the purity of the white race. Reginald Oh, Interracial Marriage in
the Shadows of Jim Crow: Racial Segregation as a System of Racial and Gender Subordination, 39
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1321, 1337–38 (2006). In response to the attempts of public institutions to integrate, opponents expressed concerns about miscegenation and the opportunities integration would
create for inter-racial marriage. See Amelia A. Miller, Note, Letting Go of a National Religion: Why
the State Should Relinquish All Control Over Marriage, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 2185, 2188 (2005)
(detailing the reaction of a Virginia newspaper in response to the admission of the first Black student
at the University of Maryland). Unsurprisingly given these concerns, early protestors of the high
Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of Education characterized it as a “social program for the amalgamation of the two races.” Oh, supra, at 1339 (quoting Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in Constitutional Struggles Over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV.
1470, 1483 (2004)); see Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Civil rights activists understood
that loathing of interracial relationships was integral to racial separation, and in response they delayed
challenging anti-miscegenation statutes due to fear that it would undermine recent civil rights successes, instead choosing plaintiffs for test integration cases because of their unlikeliness to marry. Roberts,
supra, at 176; Miller, supra, at 2188. For example, in preparing McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents
as a prelude to the NAACP’s major challenge to segregation in Brown, Thurgood Marshall specifically selected George McLaurin as a plaintiff because his advanced age made it less likely that he would
marry or intermarry. Miller, supra, at 2188 (quoting KLUGER, supra note 32, at 266 (1st ed. 1975));
see Brown, 347 U.S. at 494; McLaurin v. Okla. State Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637, 642
(1950).
141
See Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus,
1990 DUKE L.J. 431, 439–40 (“Brown held that segregated schools were unconstitutional primarily
because of the message segregation conveys—the message that black children are an untouchable
caste, unfit to be educated with white children.”).
142
See Peter J. Rubin, Reconnecting Doctrine and Purpose: A Comprehensive Approach to Strict
Scrutiny After Adarand and Shaw, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 20–21 (2000) (explaining that those at the
bottom of the hierarchy, primarily Black people, embody a stigmatized identity); see also Gowder,
supra note 109, at 328, 339–54 (using a cognitive hierarchical model to argue “the notion that blackness is worth less than whiteness [is] built into the American psyche”).
143
Brown, 347 U.S. at 494.
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ments to racial purity and white supremacy which had justified segregation
from the start. 144
The Court also failed to address the dignitary and psychic losses to whites
that would inevitably accompany integration. Restructuring the education system to distribute value more equally does not simply result in material losses
for whites. Rather, the losses are also psychic—an undercutting of the cultural
beliefs, buttressed by law and policy, that white monopoly on educational resources is both legitimate and naturally occurring. 145 That education has figured so centrally into American notions of citizenship only intensifies the perceived loss experienced as a result of the broadening of education access to
minoritized groups further down the social hierarchy. Opening white schools,
the symbol of quality American education, to Black people would necessarily
mean a relative loss of status for whites.
The Brown opinion, however, instead focused on social science purporting to affirm the inferiority complex of young Black children subject to segregation, suggesting that as Black children became more aware of their lower
social status, they would more frequently internalize feelings of inferiority and
personal humiliation. 146 Not only has this interpretation of the research been
credibly challenged, 147 but the Court also failed to ever interrogate the unjustiOh, supra note 140, at 1333–35.
As an identity, “whiteness provides social and psychological benefits to Whites,” who enjoy
“the sense of superiority [and esteem] that whiteness confers by virtue of its monopoly on political,
legal, financial, and social power.” Osamudia R. James, White Like Me: The Negative Impact of the
Diversity Rationale on White Identity Formation, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 425, 473–74 (2014). Status plays
a key role in this conferral by biasing people’s expectations of their own competence and suitability
for authority, as well as that of others. See Ridgeway, supra note 90, at 5–6. These beliefs “have selffulfilling effects . . . on behaviors and outcomes . . . creat[ing] inequalities in assertive versus deferential behavior, task performance, [and] attributions of ability . . . [in] otherwise equal [individuals].” Id.
at 6. These dynamics impact both how people present themselves for positions of authority and how
that authority is perceived. Id. The cumulative effect of these biases is that not only are those with
privileged status “tracked into positions of greater resources and power,” but that their resources and
power also come to be understood as naturally occurring, independent of the ways their privileged
status advantaged them at the start. Id. Doctrines like the diversity rationale only reinforces these
dynamics by downplaying the significance of white racial identity in the amassing and consolidation
of authority and power, and casting students of color in service roles relative to white students on
campus. James, supra, at 493–94, 494 n.325.
146
Brown, 347 U.S. at 494–95.
147
In selecting white dolls over Black dolls during the studies on which the Court relied, young
Black children were in fact signaling to researchers that they had already observed patterns of white
supremacy around them, and thus understood which doll was perceived as “more desirable.” Vinay
Harpalani, Ahmad Khalid Qadafi & Margaret Beale Spencer, Doll Studies, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
RACE AND RACISM 67, 69 (Patrick L. Mason ed., 2d ed. 2013) (2008); Brown, 347 U.S. at 494–95.
The developmentally accurate interpretation of the doll tests performed with the children of the age
tested for Brown is not that Black children believed they were of lesser value—a message children of
the age tested are not yet capable of internalizing—but that they understood that the correct answer, as
144
145
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fied sense of racial superiority and racial hierarchy that develops over time
among white schoolchildren subject to segregation. 148
It is easy to dismiss these omissions as mere rhetorical silences. Remember, however, that status hierarchies are informed by the cultural beliefs that
inform the hierarchies; for status to function, stereotypes and beliefs about
groups must be consensual. 149 Remember, too, that undermining the perceived
consensuality of such beliefs is key to dismantling status. 150 It is in these silences, then, that the architecture of status is reinforced.
Silence about status in Brown left undisturbed and unchallenged the notion of psychologically, if not also physically, inferior Black children who
needed access to white schools and white people for healing. 151 Moreover, in
failing to name the intentional ways that segregated schooling sought to affirm
the purported superiority of white people, Brown helped affirm white monopoly on resources and power as natural. 152 The tracking of the status-privileged
into positions of greater resources and power—masked as justified and expected—is in part how status is made stable. 153
Further, by making race a problem to which only people of color are subject, the Court absolved whites of any responsibility for segregation, racial isolation, and their harms, thus distancing them from the status problem to which
they were as inextricably linked as Blacks. 154 In failing to contextualize segregation as part of a system in which whites were cast as winners and Blacks as
losers, the Court also cast Blacks as outsiders laying claim to resources and
goods that implicitly and naturally belonged to white people. This framing fails
to undercut consensus beliefs about status, reaffirming through silence the
subordinate positioning of Blacks.
The seeds of Brown’s omission bore fruit in subsequent cases. Despite the
limited force of Brown and the early resistance that followed, desegregation
and integration began in earnest after the federal government began to condition the receipt of state funding on the absence of discriminatory practices, and

informed by their observations of the world around them, is to pick the white doll. See id. In short,
these young children understood status. See id.
148
Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Reconceptualizing the Harms of Discrimination: How Brown v.
Board of Education Helped to Further White Supremacy, 105 VA. L. REV. 343, 353–61 (2019).
149
See supra note 137 and accompanying text (discussing consensuality of status beliefs).
150
See supra note 138 and accompanying text (explaining the need for dismantling status).
151
Brown, 347 U.S. at 494.
152
Id.
153
Laurie T. O’Brien & Brenda Major, System-Justifying Beliefs and Psychological Well-Being:
The Roles of Group Status and Identity, 31 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. BULL. 1718, 1718–19
(2005); Ridgeway, supra note 90, at 6.
154
Randall L. Kennedy, Ackerman’s Brown, 123 YALE L.J. 3064, 3066–68 (2014).
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the Court finally provided desegregation guidance. 155 The initial solutions,
however, were marred by the near-exclusive goal of assimilating Blacks. Exemplified by one-way bussing programs that moved Black children out of their
communities and into white schools, and the dismissal of Black teachers not
permitted to teach in newly integrated schools, these integration policies reinforced status hierarchy, presenting white schools and white people as necessarily superior. 156
Moreover, the exit ramps created, in part, from the scant attention paid to
status in the Brown litigation hampered subsequent integration efforts. Relying
on a distinction between de jure and de facto segregation, the Court in 1974, in
Milliken v. Bradley, rejected district court attempts to include surrounding
white suburbs in Detroit’s integration plan. 157 The impact of racial isolation
and the status hierarchy it symbolizes, however, is no less damaging when occurring informally, a reality made clearer when considering status dynamics.
Milliken, however, built on white absolution established in Brown, affirming
the choices of white, privileged parents to avoid participation in remedying
racial discrimination. 158 The Milliken decision made invisible the nature of
white supremacy, distilling the issue of racial segregation into private choices,
155
In Brown’s wake, white supremacist Citizens’ Councils flourished alongside the resurgence of
the Ku Klux Klan. Ball, supra note 8, at 1507. White moderate politicians became politically vulnerable, prompting many to become staunch segregationists lest they be kicked out of office. Id. Southern
congressmen backed the “Southern Manifesto,” a 1956 proclamation criticizing the Court for “clear
abuse of judicial power” and calling for the use of “all lawful means” to reverse Brown. Id. at 1508
(quoting JAMES T. PATTERSON, BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION: A CIVIL RIGHTS MILESTONE AND
ITS TROUBLED LEGACY 98 (2001)) Further, southern legislatures amended their constitutions to maintain segregation, shut down all public schools in their state, or enacted school assignment and funding
policies designed to leave segregation undisturbed. Id. at 1508–10. Only once during the ten years
after Brown did the Court grant full review of a challenge to integration delays, and the Court’s silence only emboldened the opposition. Id. at 1500 n.62; see Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 16–17
(1958) (holding that the threat of disorder in Little Rock’s Central High School was an insufficient
ground for delaying desegregation). At the end of that decade, only 1.2% of Black children in the
states composing the Confederacy matriculated at schools with white children. Ball, supra, at 1500.
156
See Brent Staples, Where Did All the Black Teachers Go?, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 20, 2017), https://
www.nytimes.com/2017/04/20/opinion/where-did-all-the-black-teachers-go.html [https://perma.cc/
DV7F-UJY3] (noting that about one-third of Black teachers lost their employment in the move toward
integration); see also Deirdre Oakley, Jacob Stowell & John R. Logan, The Impact of Desegregation
on Black Teachers in the Metropolis, 1970–2000, 32 ETHNIC & RACIAL STUD. 1576, 1576 (2009)
(finding that “[m]andated desegregation . . . resulted in decreases in the black teaching force in the
South,” but small increases in the Black teaching force in the North); Madeline Will, 65 Years After
‘Brown v. Board,’ Where Are All the Black Educators?, EDUC. WK. (May 14, 2019), https://www.
edweek.org/policy-politics/65-years-after-brown-v-board-where-are-all-the-black-educators/2019/05
[https://perma.cc/58TB-EBLP] (explaining that Brown resulted in the “dismissal, demotion, or forced
resignation of many experienced, highly credentialed black educators who staffed black-only
schools”).
157
418 U.S. 717, 739–41 (1974).
158
James, supra note 51, at 1092–93.
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and ignoring the public nature of racial hierarchies. White flight can therefore
be understood as race-neutral preference rather than the status-securing political moves that Brown should have named and prohibited.
The Court’s 2007 integration case, Parents Involved in Community
Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, proceeded in the same fashion. Although framed as an equal protection case featuring the illegitimate classification of students by race for the purposes of schooling assignments, the case
nonetheless prioritized the choices of powerful white parents. 159 The plaintiffs
that brought suit challenged a race-conscious school assignment policy, which
sought to undercut or prevent the monopoly of white parents on the better resourced, oversubscribed schools in the city. 160 In striking down the school assignment plan, the Court legitimated their claims to higher status schools in the
city. Absent a status analysis, equal protection was turned upside-down to protect “innocent” white parents whose superordinate racial status helped create
their monopoly on higher-status schools in the first instance. 161
Brown and subsequent cases did not insulate whites from all the effects of
status reordering, and some whites surely incurred costs in their flight from, or
obstruction to, integration. But once white enclaves and prerogatives were
reestablished, doctrinal developments protected their consolidation of power
and resources, rendering them naturally occurring, and facilitating the monopolization of education resources that would facilitate continued dominance.
Perversely, these moves occurred against the backdrop of a triumphalist
narrative regarding race. Brown eschews an explicit commitment to addressing
white supremacy, whereas subsequent cases focused only on “remedies rather
159
See Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 709–10 (2007)
(noting that “[t]he school districts in these cases voluntarily adopted student assignment plans that rely
upon race to determine which public schools certain children may attend”).
160
In Seattle, white residents lived primarily in the Northern part of the City, while non-whites
lived in the south. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 426 F.3d 1162, 1166
(9th Cir. 2005), rev’d, Parents Involved, 551 U.S. 701 (2007). Desegregation plans were implemented
to counter the racial segregation in schools that naturally occurred if school assignments were based
on address. Id. at 1166–67. Although district plans included upgrades and renovations to all the City’s
schools in an attempt to make them all attractive to students and parents, high schools nevertheless
varied in their desirability. Id. at 1169. Three of the northern schools, including Ballard High
School—plaintiff’s first choice—were oversubscribed, with insufficient capacity to meet student demand. Id. Ballard High School underwent a $35 million dollar renovation prior to plaintiff’s selection
of the school. See id. at 1169–71 (describing the details of the school plan in place at Ballard High
School).
161
See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 750 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[R]acial imbalance can also
result from any number of innocent private decisions, including voluntary housing choices.”). Like in
so many cities, white parents’ access to more desirable schools on the North side is a direct result of
housing discrimination that was legal until 1968, and which split the city by race—one on either side
of the City’s “Mason-Dixon” line. Cara Sandberg, Getting Parents Involved in Racially Integrated
Schools, 2012 BYU EDUC. & L. J. 449, 467.
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than . . . the substantive rights of minority children” and the obligations of
whites who benefit from a racial caste system. 162 A focus on remedies allowed
whites to proclaim a belief in racial equality while avoiding the very measures
meant to ensure that equality. 163 Brown is canonized as the case that ended racial segregation in American schools, thus permitting whites to enjoy the superior social positioning afforded them through racial segregation, and all without the burden of being labeled racist.
More than just present disparities in teaching, curriculum, or facilities,
however, ongoing segregation continues to represent differences in status between Black and white. Although Americans today typically disavow such explicit denigrations of Black racial identity, the use of white racial identity as a
proxy for quality and value is ongoing. Research suggests, for example, that
particularly for white parents, school quality is “inversely related to [the percentage of Black student] enrollment in a school”; only after school quality is
“excluded on the basis of race [do] white parents . . . broaden their focus to
include additional criteria.” 164 Thus, “[f]or white Americans, the higher the
percentage [of] African American[s], the lower the status of [the] school
. . . .” 165
Devoid of explicit expressions of animus, and distinct from concerns regarding resources, the draw to white schools and the disavowal of schools with
Black children reflects status beliefs not only about the worth of particular individuals but entire communities. 166 Today’s schooling segregation maintains
the exclusion of Black students from white schools, thus maintaining their monopoly on resources and status, and preserving the superordinate status position of white students. 167 Ultimately, education is a valuable material resource
162
See Jack M. Balkin, Rewriting Brown: A Guide to the Opinions, in WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF
EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID 44, 67 (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2001) (canvassing competing assessments of Brown).
163
Id.
164
Sikkink & Emerson, supra note 25, at 271 (citing Saporito & Lareau, supra note 48, at 435)
(surveying research discussing the context of school choices).
165
Id.
166
See generally Baldwin Clark, supra note 125 (documenting how school district boundaries,
and the laws that criminalize address falsification committed in order to acquire an education in a
different district, reflect cultural borders between districts, and the racialized beliefs that those inside
the district have about the merit and worth of those outside the district); see also discussion supra Part
I and accompanying text (discussing animus as a desire to target and harm a group).
167
In higher education, these differences play out with particular force at elite institutions, where
admission functions as a status symbol, and school status tracks racial status. Admissions policies at
the institutions perpetuate the exclusion of Black people: in addition to excessive reliance on standardized test scores that better track socioeconomic status than academic capability, admissions practices
for legacy students and athletes work to maintain the institutions as predominantly white. At the nation’s more selective colleges and universities, the admissions rate for legacy students is two, four,
and sometimes five times the rate of applicants whose parents did not attend the institutions. See Dan-
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and set of opportunities that enhance, secure, or symbolize status. 168 Segregated education continues to function as a symbol of status positioning, such that
attempts to distribute the good more equitably are understood as disruptions to
the racial status order that education supports.
2. Same-Sex Marriage
Like education, marriage has also preserved hierarchies, enshrining the
superordinate status of men relative to women, and of straight couples relative
iel A. Gross, How Elite US Schools Give Preference to Wealthy and White ‘Legacy’ Applicants, THE
GUARDIAN (Jan. 23, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/jan/23/elite-schools-ivyleague-legacy-admissions-harvard-wealthier-whiter [https:/perma.cc/KZT6-92ZD] (reporting that “the
acceptance rate for legacy students [at Harvard University] is about 33%, compared with an overall acceptance rate of under 6%”); see also Melissa Korn, How Much Does Being a Legacy Help Your College
Admissions Odds?, WALL ST. J. (July 9, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/legacy-preferencescomplicate-colleges-diversity-push-1531128601 [https://perma.cc/RXC4-MGE9] (reporting that “[a]t
the University of Notre Dame . . . and Georgetown University, the admission rate for legacies is about
double the rate” of non-legacy applicants, while “[a]t Princeton University, legacies are admitted at
four times the general rate”). At institutions that have been historically majority-white, legacy preferences will generally favor white students. See Gross, supra (reporting that “among white applicants
who were accepted to Harvard, 21.5% had legacy status,” while “[o]nly 6.6% of accepted Asian applicants, and 4.8% of accepted African American applicants, were legacies”). Athletics policies at
elite colleges and universities also favor whites. According to the National Collegiate Athletics Association, 61% of college athletes were white in 2017, with the statistic rising to 65% among the Ivy
League. Saahil Desai, College Sports Are Affirmative Action for Rich White Students, THE ATLANTIC
(Oct. 23, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2018/10/college-sports-benefitswhite-students/573688/ [https://perma.cc/9YUP-4A8B]. Among selective colleges, “athletes were
given a 48 percent boost in admissions, compared with 25 percent for legacies and 18 percent for
racial minorities.” Id. At Harvard University, between 2009 and 2014, 43% of accepted white applicants were either “athletes, legacies, . . . on the dean’s interest list, [or] children of faculty and staff.”
Peter Arcidiacono, Josh Kinsler & Tyler Ransom, Legacy and Athlete Preferences at Harvard 1, 13
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 26316, 2019). Ongoing challenges to the affirmative action policies adopted to maximize racial diversity focus on the purportedly unfair advantage
from which applicants of color benefit in the admissions process. Again, expressions of animus are
absent, and, in fact, challengers often profess a commitment to simple “colorblindness.” Further, the
negligible impact on admissions rates for white applicants even in the absence of race-conscious policies suggests that opposition is not exclusively about competing claims to a limited resource. See
Sherick Hughes, Dana N. Thompson Dorsey & Juan F. Carrillo, Causation Fallacy 2.0: Revisiting the
Myth and Math of Affirmative Action, 30 EDUC. POL’Y 63, 65, 70, 83 (2016) (concluding that because
African American and Latino students made up such a small proportion of admissions at many selective universities that the complete removal of their applications would only increase the likelihood of
white admissions by about 5% at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill); see also Goodwin
Liu, The Causation Fallacy: Bakke and the Basic Arithmetic of Selective Admissions, 100 MICH. L.
REV. 1045, 1073–74 (2002) (finding that even absent affirmative action, the lead plaintiff challenging
the University of Michigan Law School’s admissions policies would most likely have been denied
admission). Rather, opposition is also about the status of the institutions, and who merits access to the
valuable good of elite education.
168
Education can also be understood as a graduated nominal characteristic that orders people
according to how much education they possess. Moreover, specific schools can operate as sites of
status where esteem is conferred by virtue of enrollment.
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to same-sex couples. That same-sex couples in some states pre-Obergefell
could enjoy marriage-alternatives with the same material benefits is telling.
Marriage was not merely an issue of economics or estate planning. Rather, the
denial of marriage had symbolic meaning, serving as a mechanism by which
straight people maintained superior social status to gays and lesbians; marriage
was “the chief means by which culture maintain[ed] heterosexuality as a social
identity.” 169 Marriage ultimately conferred esteem on those heterosexual couples who could and wanted to enter it, enhancing or maintaining their status
relative to the same-sex couples who could not. 170 Laws reserving marriage for
only heterosexual couples conveyed approval and acceptance from which heterosexual couples benefitted.
In addition, men particularly benefitted from the social conventions regarding gender that traditional marriage affirmed and same-sex marriage undercut. Even though marriage has historically “bestowed benefits” to both men
(“services of a wife”) and women (“financial support from [a] husband”), the
institution has not been an equitable one. 171 Marriage is legally anchored in the
common law understanding that a wife is her husband’s property. 172 According
to this framework, women were naturally subordinate, and a husband legally
exerted “control over his wife, her body, and the products of her labor, from
the children she bore to her earnings and property.” 173 As a result, marriage
functioned for men as a guarantor of a long-lived life filled with health and
happiness. 174 In contrast, and particularly for women who did not work outside
the home, marriage could function as a source of status denigration, depression, isolation, and deprivation of personhood. 175
169
David B. Cruz, “Just Don’t Call It Marriage”: The First Amendment and Marriage as an
Expressive Resource, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 925, 957 (2001) (quoting Richard D. Mohr, The Stakes in the
Gay-Marriage Wars, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: THE MORAL AND LEGAL DEBATE 105, 106 (Robert
M. Baird & Stuart E. Rosenbaum eds., 1997)).
170
As with most American phenomena, here, too, race plays a part, with studies suggesting that
people of color, especially Blacks and Latinos, marry at lower rates relative to whites. The possible
reasons for this are varied, ranging from “family arrangements and . . . economic hardships” that mute
the “financial incentives [of] marriage,” to a tacit understanding that marriage will not necessarily
yield the mainstream acceptance it brings whites. Darren Lenard Hutchinson, “Gay Rights” for “Gay
Whites”?: Race, Sexual Identity, and Equal Protection Discourse, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1358, 1370–
72 (2000).
171
Kerry Abrams, Marriage Fraud, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 43–44 (2012).
172
Id. at 10.
173
Mary Anne Case, Lecture, Marriage Licenses, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1758, 1765 (2005).
174
JESSIE BERNARD, THE FUTURE OF MARRIAGE 23 (Bantam Books 1973).
175
Id. at 46–52. A series of court rulings affirming a more democratic version of marriage undercut the socially and legally sanctioned superior status of men within marriage, and helped to dismantle
a gendered breadwinner/homemaker model of marriage. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S.
677, 690–91 (1973) (holding that federal law requiring differing qualifications for male and female
spousal dependency violated the Due Process Clause); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 636,
642–53 (1975) (holding that Social Security regulations that transferred benefits of a deceased hus-
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These dynamics prompted feminists in the 1960s and 1970s to promote a
“vision of egalitarian marriage” in which women who chose more traditional
roles in marriage would not be penalized, and husbands and wives shared
breadwinning and caregiving responsibilities more equally. 176 Although the
law today does not enshrine assumptions about roles in marriage on the basis
of sex, cultural expectations regarding male dominance and privilege still
shape heterosexual marriages to the potential disadvantage of the women who
enter them. 177
Same-sex marriages, however, neither necessarily involve men nor take
for granted the superordinate position of men within spousal relationships.
“Just as whites [can] have a stake in the preservation of their [superordinate]
identity, so [can] heterosexuals,” and a reordering can be psychologically destabilizing. 178 Destabilization can be even more intense for those who ground
their opposition to same-sex marriage in religion. Not only are these opponents
guided by the sense of moral authority that religion tends to imbue, but also by
the more rigid gender roles that Judeo-Christian religions enshrine more generally. The identification of Christianity with “true” American cultural identity

band and father to both the wife and children, but prohibited the transfer of benefits for a deceased
wife and mother to the husband, while permitting transfer only to children, violated the Due Process
Clause); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 201–02 (1977) (holding that gender-based requirements
for survivor’s benefits which required men, but not women, to receive half of their spouse’s support at
the time of death violated the Due Process Clause).
176
BERNARD, supra note 174, at 140–42; Serena Mayeri, After Suffrage: The Unfinished Business of Feminist Legal Advocacy, 129 YALE L.J. F. 512, 525 (2020), https://www.yalelawjournal.org/
pdf/Mayeri_AfterSuffrage_6zdc11i7.pdf [https://perma.cc/KT3L-PHDB].
177
Research on marital satisfaction and happiness supports the idea that men benefit more from
marriage than do women. Self-reported studies, for example, find that although married people report
being happier than unmarried people in general, “married men [in particular] are happier than married
women,” owing to the “emotional gratification” and support for professional pursuits that men enjoy
through marriages. Robert H. Coombs, Marital Status and Personal Well-Being: A Literature Review,
40 FAM. RELS. 97, 97–100 (1991). Researchers also theorize that consistent benefits for married men
relative to married women “in terms of both morbidity and mortality” are due to a “subordinationreactivity hypothesis”: because “women generally occupy subordinate status” within marriages,
“spousal conflict [more] adversely influences [their] physiology and health.” Rebekah Wanic & James
Kulik, Toward an Understanding of Gender Differences in the Impact of Marital Conflict on Health,
65 SEX ROLES 297, 297 (2011); see also Joan K. Monin & Margaret S. Clark, Why Do Men Benefit
More from Marriage Than Do Women? Thinking More Broadly About Interpersonal Processes That
Occur Within and Outside of Marriage, 65 SEX ROLES 320, 321 (2011) (summarizing the evidence
that “[m]en [d]erive [m]ore [h]ealth [b]enefits from [m]arriage” and suggesting that the reasons for the
differences are “multifaceted and complex”).
178
See Balkin, supra note 5, at 2363 (“Homosexuals undermine social meanings about gender
that perpetuate male supremacy; homosexuality also threatens notions of family organized around
patriarchal privilege. Demands by homosexuals for increased status—which include challenging the
idea that they are immoral and deviant—undermine the superordinate identity of heterosexuals as
surely as demands by blacks or women undermine the superordinate identities of whites and males.”).
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only intensifies the stakes in terms of status loss. 179 Same-sex marriage, then,
threatens both moral commitments and signifiers of centrality in mainstream
American culture.
Marriage has played a central role in American political imagination and
economy, and society “depicts marriage as a source of . . . happiness, companionship, financial security, and even good health.” 180 Obergefell affirmed this
view, characterizing marriage as a “keystone” institution “at the center of so
many facets of the legal and social order.”181 As such, exclusion from marriage
necessarily conveys messages about the esteem and honor denied those who
are excluded.
The same-sex marriage movement has worked to expand these notions of
worth by broadening access to marriage for gay and lesbian couples through a
series of litigation victories that implicated social belonging for gays and lesbians. 182 Notably, these gains were won outside of judicial frameworks typically
used to determine whether discrimination against a particular group is suspect.
Although race and gender have been subject to a “suspect class analysis,” the
“emerging” class of gays and lesbians have not; rather, their string of equal
protection victories before the Court have been on the basis of a finding of animus. 183
Obergefell, however, marked a shift away from a finding (and rejection)
of animus, the dominant frame through which the Court had theretofore been

179
For a rich exploration of the identification with Christianity and “genuine” American identity,
see Caroline Mala Corbin, The Supreme Court’s Facilitation of White Christian Nationalism, 71 ALA.
L. REV. 833, 834, 838–39 (2020) (quoting Jager v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist., 862 F.2d 824, 829 (11th
Cir. 1989)) (arguing that the defining characteristic of Christian nationalism “is the belief that religious identity and national identity overlap completely”; that “the United States is and should be a
Christian nation”; and that “Christian insiders . . . are true Americans and non-Christian outsiders . . .
are not”).
180
Melissa Murray, Marriage as Punishment, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1, 4 (2012). Particularly
among “those who have never wed, marriage remains a life goal,” with 61% of never-married men
and women stating that at some point, they would want to marry. D’Vera Cohn, Love and Marriage,
PEW RSCH. CTR. (Feb. 13, 2013), https://www.pewresearch.org/social-trends/2013/02/13/love-andmarriage/ [https://perma.cc/6JTD-X7JT]. Similarly, 36% of adults report that “[h]aving a successful
marriage is ‘one of the most important things’ in life,” with “[a]n additional 48% [reporting] it is ‘very
important but not the most’ important.” Id.
181
576 U.S. 644, 669–70 (2015).
182
See United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 775 (2013) (concluding that the purpose of DOMA was “to disparage and . . . injure” gay and lesbian married couples, in deviation from traditional
rules of federalism and deference to the state in matters of domestic relations); see also Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 582 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (concluding that “moral disapproval” of
gays and lesbians “is insufficient to satisfy rational basis review”); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635
(1996) (concluding that Colorado’s “Amendment 2 classifies homosexuals not to further a proper
legislative [interest]” but rather purposefully to burden them as a class).
183
ARAIZA, supra note 120, at 3–4.
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evaluating claims of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. 184 The
case “considered challenges to several states’ laws banning same-sex marriage,” leaving the Court unable to conclude that all states had been infected
with subjective bad intent as it might with a challenge to “one statute, enacted
by one [legislative body].” 185 Moreover, unlike Windsor, which involved a
challenge to Congress’s attempt to enshrine a definition of marriage in federal
law, state bans on same-sex marriage were not about the division of authority
between state and federal government. Forced to engage with the religious and
philosophical underpinnings of the state laws, Justice Kennedy pivoted to an
analysis of dignity. 186
Distinct from animus, and from “group-based [equal protection] claims
under the guarantees of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments,” dignity is
rooted in due process guarantees of the same. 187 Justice Kennedy’s focus on
dignity—specifically, the respect and honor same-sex couples deserve—tracks
notions of status. Moreover, acknowledgement in the opinion that the dignitary
value in recognition and affirmation of same-sex couples and their families is a
rhetorical move that is particularly instructive for thinking about status. 188
Stigma, defined as “the situation of the individual who is disqualified from full

See generally 576 U.S. 644 (2015) (lacking a discussion of animus).
Id. at 655; ARAIZA, supra note 120, at 170 (describing how the Windsor case “allowed the
Court to return to the idea of subjective bad intent” and conducting a comparison to Obergefell).
Windsor involved one such contest to one law passed by one body, allowing the Court to find animus
more directly. 570 U.S. at 770; ARAIZA, supra note 120, at 170; see also supra note 79 and accompanying text (discussing the Windsor Court’s reasoning).
186
Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 656–81; ARAIZA, supra note 120, at 170–71.
187
Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 748–49 (2011) (footnotes
omitted).
188
In doing so, the Court potentially opened up new doctrinal and jurisprudential avenues for
societal equality. See, e.g., Elizabeth B. Cooper, The Power of Dignity, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 3, 5
(2015) (considering the “historical and judicial equating of homosexuality and stigma with the Court’s
development of a jurisprudence of dignity for gay men and lesbians, culminating in its decision in
Obergefell v. Hodges”); Alexis M. Piazza, The Right to Education After Obergefell, 43 THE HARBINGER 62, 66–73 (2019) (analyzing how four key doctrinal and rhetorical moves in Obergefell paved the
way for the development of a “fundamental right to education”); Steve Sanders, supra note 70, at
2069 (2019) (characterizing the Court’s dignity jurisprudence as “majoritarian” decisions “broadly
accepted” because they reflect society’s “dramatic and long-term changes in cultural and public attitudes” about gays and lesbians in American life); Laurence H. Tribe, Equal Dignity: Speaking Its
Name, 129 HARV. L. REV. F. 16, 17 (2015), https://harvardlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/
11/vol129_Tribe.pdf [https://perma.cc/WTD8-K4FT] (presenting “equal dignity” as Obergefell’s
principal contribution to equality jurisprudence, and the “groundwork for an ongoing constitutional
dialogue about fundamental rights and the meaning of equality”); Kenji Yoshino, A New Birth of
Freedom?: Obergefell v. Hodges, 129 HARV. L. REV. 147, 148, 179 (2015) (characterizing Obergefell
as a “game changer for substantive due process jurisprudence,” stressing liberty over equality,
“plac[ing] a far stronger emphasis on the intertwined nature of liberty and equality,” and thus potentially “open[ing] new channels of liberty”).
184
185
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social acceptance,” 189 attached to gay and lesbian people and was justified on
both moral and religious grounds. 190 Stigma prompted the criminalization of
gay sex, the “collateral consequences . . . [of] conviction under th[o]se laws,”
and the social condemnation those laws necessarily communicated. 191 Dignity
functions as the opposite of stigma in gay rights cases. 192 In writing for the
majority, Justice Kennedy cast matrimony as an antidote to the social exclusion gays and lesbians experienced (or at least those gays and lesbians who
wished to marry).
But for whose benefit were gays and lesbians stigmatized? Missing from
the Obergefell and Windsor opinions was the same analysis absent in Brown:
the identification of harm not only as injuring the subordinated group, but also
as benefitting the subordinating group. 193 The Obergefell majority did not confront equality costs for those at the top of the hierarchy, thus increasing the
likelihood of retreat. 194 When the Court fails to confront the dominant group,
attempts by the dominant group to reinstate its hierarchical position later are
easier to make and harder to name. And, like in Brown, the Court again made
invisible the complicity of straight people in the marginalization of gay people. 195 As such, like the Brown decision delivered sixty-one years before it, the
Obergefell litigation also paved exit ramps away from equality, failing to confront heteronormativity and gender in ways that more thoroughly disrupt status
hierarchies. 196
The Court ultimately depicted marriage—a good historically limited to
straight (or straight-performing) persons—“as an institution that confers digniCooper, supra note 188, at 6 (quoting ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON THE MANAGE(1963)).
190
Id. at 7–8.
191
Id. at 8.
192
But see Yuvraj Joshi, The Respectable Dignity of Obergefell v. Hodges, 6 CALIF. L. REV. CIR.
117, 117 (2015), https://29qish1lqx5q2k5d7b491joo-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/
2015/11/117-125Joshi_final-CIRCUIT.pdf [https://perma.cc/DS8M-LD7S] (arguing that Obergefell
shifted dignity “from respect for the freedom to choose toward the respectability of choices and choice
makers”).
193
See generally Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015) (lacking an identification of harm to
the subordinated group, and benefit to the subordinating group); United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S.
744 (2013) (same); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (same).
194
See generally Obergefell, 576 U.S. 644 (2015) (lacking discussion of equality costs for higher
status groups).
195
See generally id. (lacking discussion of subordinating group’s complicity in marginalizing the
subordinated group); Brown, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (same).
196
See supra note 195 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s failure to address equality).
I make this claim irrespective of whether Obergefell was decided on equal protection or due process
grounds. Although some of the recognition work I argue is absent might have been accomplished had
the Court declared sexual orientation a suspect class, Brown was notably decided on equal protection
grounds, only to yield the same problematic doctrinal omissions.
189
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ty” on gays and lesbians wishing to marry. 197 Although the Court did address
the stigma that same-sex marriage bans impose on same-sex couples, the
Court’s response to that stigma was to invite same-sex couples to perform
more like straight people—an invitation that reinforces the superordinate status
of straight people. 198 Gays and lesbians who wish to marry, then, can be understood by others in society as interlopers disrupting the “natural” order of
things—a framing that finds traction in claims that gays and lesbians engage in
behavior that deviates from the “norm” reflected among higher status people.
This framing fails to undercut consensuality around the status of straight people relative to gays and lesbians.
Contrast this framing to the Constitutional Court of South Africa, which
deemed bans on same-sex marriage unconstitutional nearly a decade before the
U.S. Supreme Court. Placing marriage in its proper context, the Constitutional
Court acknowledged that marriage is not always the goal for same-sex couples,
and that families take many different forms. 199 The South African court went
further, making clear that marriage does not confer dignity on those who enter
it; “rather, it is the legal right to decide whether to marry—and whether to marry someone of the same sex—that is central to dignity.” 200 Same-sex couples
should have those choices not because it will make them as respectable as heterosexual couples, but because they are as deserving of those choices as their
straight peers. 201 In essence, their equal status compels equal choice. These
distinctions in language may be nuanced, but ultimately they matter.
Like Brown, the failures of Obergefell may bear rotten fruit down the line.
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission and State v.
Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., for example, implicate status most acutely, pitting the
centrality of straight Christians against the status of same-sex couples. 202 Unlike resistance to integrated education, which is motivated, in part, by material
competition, same-sex marriage is not zero-sum; the extension of marriage to
same-sex couples does not potentially undercut the availability of marriage for
197
Holning Lau, Marriage Equality and Family Diversity: Comparative Perspectives from the
United States and South Africa, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2615, 2616–17 (2017).
198
Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 665.
199
See Lau, supra note 197, at 2617–18 (discussing Justice Albert “Albie” Louis Sachs’ reasoning in Minister of Home Affairs v. Fourie 2006 (1) SA 524 (CC) (S. Afr.)).
200
Id. at 2617 (summarizing the holding of Fourie).
201
Joshi, supra note 192, at 117–18 (arguing that dignity, as presented in Justice Kennedy’s
Obergefell opinion “depends on same-sex couples . . . choosing the heterosexual norm of marriage . . .
being and showing themselves to be worthy of marriage; and . . . being socially acceptable and accepted”).
202
See supra notes 81–88 and accompanying text (discussing the Masterpiece Cakeshop and
Arlene’s Flowers cases). See generally Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1724 (2018) (discussing the shop owner’s religious reasons for turning down service); Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., 389 P.3d
543, 549 (Wash. 2017), vacated and remanded mem., 138 S. Ct. 2671 (2018) (same).
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opposite-sex couples. Moreover, plaintiffs in Masterpiece Cakeshop and Arlene’s Flowers disavowed any animus regarding same-sex couples, anchoring
their complaint squarely in their own religious beliefs. 203 Assuming religious
objections to same-sex marriage are sincere, then, Masterpiece Cakeshop and
Arlene’s Flowers represent a clash of values, and, accordingly, an insistence by
plaintiffs that their values, their beliefs, and their status, remain central.
Reflecting the multiple axes of status at play, the Masterpiece Cakeshop
plaintiff, Jack Phillips, was a white, heterosexual, Christian male. 204 As such,
Phillips represented a group that most benefitted from the exclusion of samesex couples from marriage, and was most vulnerable to status disruption after
Obergefell. 205 Because Obergefell was not forthcoming in identifying the beneficiaries of the status hierarchy at issue, Phillips was free to attempt to reclaim
superior status absent pushback from the Court. 206 By invoking animus in the
Court’s opinion, Justice Kennedy essentially affirmed Phillips’s empirical
claim that his traditional morals were no longer dominating majoritarian culture and required judicial solicitude as a result. 207 Phillips was free to try to
reinstate his superior status, and the Court invoked minority status to facilitate
that reinstatement. 208
The liberty versus equality framing of cases like Masterpiece Cakeshop
implicates important and perhaps conflicting constitutional commitments to
liberty and equality. 209 It also, however, implicates a status match-up for which
our jurisprudence currently provides limited, if any, guidance. Nor do subsequent victories for LGBTQ rights necessarily mediate the status problem. Bostock v. Clayton County, for example, was justifiably celebrated for its conclu203
Indeed, both parties in Arlene’s Flowers stipulated that shop owner Barronelle Stutzman had
been willingly serving plaintiffs for nine years. 389 P.3d at 548–49; Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct.
at 1724.
204
Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1724.
205
See supra notes 169–181 and accompanying text (discussing Obergefell and status in the context of same-sex marriage).
206
See generally Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015) (failing to identify those that are
beneficiaries of status hierarchy).
207
See Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1737 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“It is in protecting
unpopular religious beliefs that we prove this country’s commitment to serving as a refuge for religious freedom.”). One legal professor goes further, suggesting that the Court cast plaintiffs as minorities in need of the Court’s protection in the face of subordination. Murray, supra note 136, at 282.
208
See Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1740 (Gorsuch, J., concurring ) (holding that Phillips
proved his case on First Amendment grounds and “after almost six years facing unlawful civil charges, he is entitled to judgment”). Of course, lower courts have taken contrary positions. Moreover,
some observers might characterize the Court’s decision as a justifiable attempt to split the baby, recognizing both religious liberty and the dignity of same-sex couples. I am not so optimistic, however,
regarding future decisions in which religious animus will not be a plausible claim and the Court will
be forced to resolve (more explicitly) a clash between liberty and equality.
209
Murray, supra note 136, at 257. See generally Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018)
(holding that the Commission had shown anti-religious bias toward Phillips).
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sion that Title VII’s prohibitions against discrimination on the basis of sex necessarily includes sexual orientation and gender identity. 210 In writing for the
majority, however, Justice Neil M. Gorsuch pointedly reserves space for challenges to the ruling on the basis of religious liberty, going so far as to suggest
that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA) is a “super statute” that could “displac[e] the normal operation” of Title VII. 211 Due to a religious liberty that is most likely to protect straight white males, status endures.
As one in a series of claims justifying discrimination against LGBTQ individuals as expressions of religious beliefs, Masterpiece Cakeshop might signal an early surge in pushback to the most recent gains in LGBTQ equality.212
This surge is undergirded by a commitment to the prioritization of straight
people, as buttressed by American Christian beliefs—an ordering that went
unchallenged by both the Obergefell and Masterpiece Cakeshop Courts. 213
Having failed to consider how straight people are implicated in heteronormativity that stratifies society, even the wins of the same-sex movement insufficiently dismantle the status privilege afforded straight people generally, and
men in particular. Like the abandonment of integration after Brown, we may
witness yet a steady hollowing out of any commitment to full dignity and
equality for gays and lesbians. Access sought through litigation ultimately becomes formal equality lacking in much substance at all.
III. ACCOUNTING FOR STATUS
Backlash in response to status disruptions may be inevitable and not easily addressed. Nor are simple changes in language sufficient to stave off the
reconstitution of temporarily destabilized racial orders.214 Nevertheless, equality advocates may have opportunities to better account for status over the
lifespan of equality movements, ranging from early decisions to challenges
status hierarchies, to policy implementation after status disruptions are accom140 S. Ct. 1731, 1754 (2020).
Id. at 1753–54.
212
See Terri R. Day & Danielle Weatherby, LGBT Rights and the Mini RFRA: A Return to Separate but Equal, 65 DEPAUL L. REV. 907, 907–08, 919–28 (2016) (canvassing both the efforts of lawmakers to set free exercise rights against LGBTQ rights as well as anecdotal evidence of the increasing denial of service to same-sex couples in the name of religious freedom).
213
See id. at 908–09 (detailing some of the acts of civil disobedience characterizing the surge).
See generally Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (lacking any challenge to American Christian
beliefs); Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015) (same).
214
In Loving v. Virginia, for example, the Court explicitly cast anti-miscegenation laws as tools
used to maintain white supremacy, a rhetorical move that did not automatically dismantle racial hierarchies. See 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (“There is patently no legitimate overriding purpose independent of
invidious racial discrimination which justifies this classification. The fact that Virginia prohibits only
interracial marriages involving white persons demonstrates that the racial classifications must stand on
their own justification, as measures designed to maintain White Supremacy.”).
210
211
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plished. Part III conducts an initial analysis regarding opportunities to account
for status and mediate long-term retrenchment in the context of litigation, policy, and discourse. Section A of this Part discusses how status may be better
accounted for in law and litigation. 215 Section B provides recommendations for
how policy can also account for status hierarchies. 216 Finally, Section C considers how societal narratives about status loss might be reframed to more productive ends. 217
A. Law and Litigation
Calls to better account for status naturally align with calls to adopt an anti-subordination approach to discrimination and equal protection. Antisubordination theorists argue that we cannot achieve equal citizenship while
“pervasive social stratification” remains; as such, “law[s] should reform institutions and practices that enforce the [subordinate] social status of historically
oppressed groups.” 218
Despite the advocacy of scholars and lawyers for such an approach, Supreme Court doctrine has rejected anti-subordination theory, instead adopting
an anti-classification approach to equal protection. 219 As a result, the Court has
scrutinized both benign and invidious racial classifications subject to the same
forms of judicial scrutiny. Under this approach to equality, the Court has preserved facially neutral laws with disparate impact on minority groups as long
as discriminatory intent cannot be found, while prohibiting race-conscious
government policies intended to address racial inequality. 220
Insufficient focus on status, however, is not only a failure of doctrine. Rather, advocates themselves are vulnerable to the same failures. Consider the
following excerpt from the appellants’ brief in Brown v. Board of Education:
[R]acial segregation injures infant appellants in denying them the
opportunity available to all other racial groups to learn to live, work
See infra notes 218–238 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 239–249 and accompanying text.
217
See infra notes 250–273 and accompanying text.
218
Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition: Anticlassification or
Antisubordination?, 58 U. MIA. L. REV. 9, 9 (2003).
219
Id. at 10. But see id. at 14 (arguing that although “the American legal system did not embrace”
an anti-subordination approach, the approach was “never repudiated,” and remains a hope for civil
rights law).
220
See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 747–48
(2007) (striking down school assignment plans meant to integrate public schools by considering the
racial identity of students); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 486 (1989) (declaring
societal discrimination as an insufficiently compelling justification for a set-aside minority business
program); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 287–91 (1987) (upholding a Georgia death penalty
statute despite conclusive evidence illustrating the impact of race on sentencing).
215
216
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and cooperate with children representative of approximately 90% of
the population of the society in which they live; to develop citizenship skills; and to adjust themselves personally and socially in a setting comprising a cross-section of the dominant population. . . .
[S]egregation under law denies to the Negro status, power and privilege; interferes with his motivation for learning; and instills in him a
feeling of inferiority resulting in a personal insecurity, confusion and
frustration that condemns him to an ineffective role as a citizen and
member of society. 221
Although the brief acknowledged the subordinate status of Blacks at the time,
it did not address the superordinate status of whites who had insisted on that
ranking. The political and cultural landscape at the time certainly requires a
sympathetic assessment of litigation strategy that eschewed direct attacks on
white supremacy. Nevertheless, the appellants’ posture incurred costs in its
focus on Black, rather than white, pathology. Appeals are made regarding minoritized status without acknowledgment of the dominant groups that render
minoritized groups subordinate, or the corresponding tradeoffs in status that
equality will bring.
Petitioner’s brief in Obergefell v. Hodges similarly did little to engage the
relational dynamics of status hierarchy. Like in Brown, the brief focused solely
on the harm to gay and lesbian couples, noting that they were denied dignity,
integrity, and subjected to daily hardships. 222 Same-sex couples denied access
to marriage were unquestionably subject to these harms and more. Unchallenged, however, was the way in which access to marriage was constructed to
enhance and secure the status of straight, white men, just as access to public
education was constructed to enhance the status of whites. By glorifying marriage while demanding access to it, petitioners defended, rather than challenged, status hierarchy.
The goal of access can be a crucial element of how equality is experienced. A focus on access, however, can also prompt concessions to the very
status hierarchies that constrain access. To make access palatable, access is
tokenized and limited to the privileged few; access also concedes the form of
the institutions to which access is demanded, even as those institutions help to
maintain status hierarchies. 223 Heterosexual marriage, and the norms that de221
Brief for Appellants, Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (No. 1), 1952 WL 47265, at
*9 (citations omitted).
222
Brief for Petitioners at 3–4, Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015) (No.14-556), 2015
WL 860738, at *3–4.
223
See, e.g., Yuvraj Joshi, The Trouble with Inclusion, 21 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & LAW 207, 207,
221, 227 (2014) (arguing that “inclusion is less likely to achieve . . . justice where it . . . maintains the
status quo . . . [or] legitimizes [inequality in] the institution”).
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veloped as a result, became the default, as did white schools and the norms
about education that stem from their organization. 224 Both phenomena, as either resources used to maintain status, or as status symbols themselves, are
ultimately preserved.
In the wake of Brown, for example, the NAACP developed a pattern for
initiating suits in which their legal arm—the Legal Defense Fund (LDF)—
directed all litigation after local attorneys recruited plaintiffs. 225 In coordinating litigation, the LDF was driven by the compelling symbolic meaning of integrated schools in the fight for equal opportunity, a status issue to be sure. The
organization, however, also answered to the middle-class Blacks and whites on
whom the NAACP relied for support, and for whom integration had worked
well. As a result, desegregation at all costs remained the goal of litigation strategy. The NAACP remained faithful to this strategy, even after it became obvious that alternatives to desegregation, like genuinely equal funding for Black
schools, should have been considered in response to white resistance, and even
after Black parents themselves asked for those alternatives. 226
In Boston, for example, NAACP lawyers rejected a plan proposed by local Black leaders who did not want to abandon desegregation, but did want to
modify desegregation plans to place greater emphasis on upgrading school
quality, maintaining assignments at already-integrated schools, and “minimizing busing [of Black children] to the poorest and most violent white districts.” 227 In Atlanta, the LDF attacked a compromise plan in which Black
leaders, recognizing “the difficulty of achieving meaningful desegregation in a
district . . . [that was] 82 percent Black,” agreed that alongside “limited pupil
desegregation,” steps would be taken to fully integrate faculty and employees,
and “to hire a number of blacks in top administrative positions, including [the]
superintendent of schools.” 228 These litigation decisions raise important questions about the extent to which representation in the civil rights arena is driven
224
See, e.g., Baldwin Clark, supra note 125, at 566 (describing how the concept of “stealing education” is facilitated and maintained by racialized school district boundaries).
225
Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School
Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470, 475–76 (1976). This pattern was actually grounded in
litigation strategy dating back to the 1930s, as a set of strategic decisions “in which every conceivable
aspect of segregated schools was challenged.” Id. at 472–73.
226
Id. at 487–92. Tomiko Brown-Nagin has complicated this description of the NAACP’s work,
highlighting regions in which the interests of poorer Blacks aligned with ardent integrationists even as
middle-class Blacks remained ambivalent about desegregation. See generally TOMIKO BROWNNAGIN, COURAGE TO DISSENT: ATLANTA AND THE LONG HISTORY OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (2011) (discussing the NAACP’s work in school desegregation). The work of Bell, NaginBrown, and others illustrates that sentiments in Black communities about civil rights advances are
indeed complex and contextual.
227
Bell, supra note 225, at 482.
228
Id. at 485.
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by excessive deference to the most “palatable” of the class—a deference that
fails to account for status.
Admittedly, an issue like school desegregation can cut both ways. The integration of white schools disrupts the conferral of high status by virtue of
whiteness. At the same time, the equal resources that some parents desired for
Black schools might have also undermined a narrative on inferiority, particularly as genuinely equal resources began to produce equal opportunities and
outcomes. Thus, the takeaway is not that one approach is necessarily wrong;
indeed, integration could have been pursued alongside pursuit of equal resources for those schools for which integration was not feasible. Rather, the
takeaway is that exclusive focus on palatability is about access to an existing
hierarchy, shifting focus away from a destabilizing hierarchy. This strategy
further marginalizes the least powerful of minoritized communities, ensuring
that the “wins” inadequately serve them, if at all. 229 This critique is even more
germane given the failure of the original litigation strategies in Brown to secure long-term education reform as it implicates race.
The same-sex marriage movement is subject to similar critiques, specifically that the movement sidelined the concerns of less palatable, but more vulnerable members of the queer community in pursuit of access. The Obergefell
litigation team chose plaintiffs that were disproportionately white, genderconforming, educated, affluent, and parents. This, despite the fact that members
of the LGBTQ community “are more likely to be low-income and non-white . . .
[and] in an interracial relationship,” and to be parents at lower rates than suggested by the plaintiffs in their representative capacity. 230 Furthermore, petitioners’ brief presented marriage as a “cherished status,” the operation of
which in the lives of same-sex couples is the same as that of opposite-sex couples. 231 In addition to presenting a “homogenous and non-representative” image of gays and lesbians, this selection reified traditional norms about family, 232 losing opportunities to celebrate the transformative potential of the queer
229
Of course, civil rights litigation often does seek to destabilize hierarchy, as is the case with
public school integration litigation, which sought to disrupt the racial hierarchies that underwrote
segregated schools. Nevertheless, litigation can be constrained by the very hierarchies that prompt it,
significantly curtailing the transformative potential of movements.
230
Cynthia Godsoe, Perfect Plaintiffs, 125 YALE L.J. F. 136, 145–46, 149 (2015), https://www.
yalelawjournal.org/pdf/Godsoe_PDF_w3e8dk2x.pdf [https://perma.cc/9HCH-7V6G] (footnote omitted).
231
Brief for Petitioners at 3, Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015) (No.14-556), 2015 WL
860738, at *3.
232
Godsoe, supra note 230, at 145. To the extent that plaintiffs either had children or were caring
for ill partners or parents, the plaintiffs reinscribed the “privatization of dependency,” and the valorization of childcare and traditional marriage. Id. at 150. Scholars further worry about the potential loss
of material benefits for those same-sex couples opting not to marry, as well as the potential denial of
parental rights for unmarried gay couples. Kaiponanea T. Matsumura, A Right Not to Marry, 84
FORDHAM L. REV. 1509, 1510–11, 1518 (2016); Serena Mayeri, Marriage (In)equality and the His-
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family, and suggesting that human rights must be earned by performing
straightness, whiteness, and privilege. 233
Accordingly, the pursuit of same-sex marriage has been critiqued as catering to white and upper-class people, especially given data suggesting that
Blacks and Latinos exercise their right to marry at lower rates, 234 as well as a
decrease in marital rates across society more generally. 235 Moreover, in those
“state[s] where all the material benefits of marriage were already granted to
same-sex couples through domestic partnership,” problems like sexual assault
of transgendered prisoners, or inadequate protection or representation for queer
and transgender people subject to immigration enforcement were sidelined in
favor of marriage. 236
Ultimately, the harm of this assimilative approach might be best illustrated by increasing litigation seeking to curtail transgender rights. Between 2001
and 2011, anti-discrimination measures protecting both sexual orientation and
gay rights were largely successful; after 2012, however, campaigns seeking to
deny transgender individuals the right to use bathrooms of their choice have
become anchors for rollbacks and repeals of anti-discrimination laws, purporttorical Legacies of Feminism, 6 CALIF. L. REV. CIR. 126, 127 (2015), https://29qish1lqx5q2k5d7b491
joo-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/126-136Mayeri-final-CIRCUIT.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LPF8-WB4L].
233
See Capers, supra note 58, at 728–29 (asking why the queer community is surrendering to the
normativity and hegemony of marriage, instead of questioning how and why it is incentivized, understanding it “as another form of state regulation,” and “interrogating its disciplining function”); Melissa
Murray, What’s So New About the New Illegitimacy?, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER, SOC. POL’Y & LAW 387,
432–33 (2012) (arguing that even though marriage equality advocates argued that their goals had the
potential to make “marriage more egalitarian and progressive,” the movement’s invocation of issues
like illegitimacy actually aligned them with the “neoliberal vision of the private . . . family”). See
generally Godsoe, supra note 230 (reviewing the pleadings and media items about the Obergefell
plaintiffs to draw conclusions about the story the plaintiffs were selected to present).
234
This dynamic has only been aggravated by rhetoric deployed by pro-gay and lesbian scholars
that draw analogies and distinctions between “people of color” and “gays and lesbians,” treating the
two groups as mutually exclusive, and thus erasing Black and brown people from the equality movement while presenting whites as the face of LGBTQ equality. Hutchinson, supra note 170, at 1368–
72; see also Russell K. Robinson, Marriage Equality and Postracialism, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1010,
1010–11, 1035–58 (2014) (analyzing post-racial narratives in the gay rights movement as they appear
in “[m]edia [c]overage and [p]olitical [a]dvocacy [and in] [s]ame [s]ex [m]arriage litigation,” that
presented gay white men as the face of the equality movement, and advanced a concept of gay rights
as distinct from women’s rights or racial justice, such that queer women and people of color were
excluded as relevant constituents).
235
See Sally C. Curtin & Paul D. Sutton, Marriage Rates in the United States, 1900-2018, NAT’L
CTR. FOR HEALTH STATS.: HEALTH E-STATS 1, 4 (Apr. 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hestat/
marriage_rate_2018/marriage_rate_2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/3C47-4YYV] (finding that in 2018,
marriage fell to 6.5 per 1,000 people—the lowest level in the 118-year period covered by the report);
see also CARBONE & CAHN, supra note 62, at 6 (finding that although marriage rates are declining
generally, they are in steepest decline among the poor).
236
Dean Spade, Under the Cover of Gay Rights, 37 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 79, 81–82
(2013).
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edly justified by religious beliefs and concerns about the safety of women. 237
The acceptance of gays and lesbians, but not of transgender people, is due in
part to the movement’s focus on “normalcy” as defined by heteronormative
and cis-gendered conventions. The gap it created in terms of social acceptance
is not only one on which opponents have readily capitalized, but also an illustration of how status hierarchies emerge even within coalitions between marginalized groups. 238
Given the anxieties that status shifts predictably prompt, presenting and
demanding only that which is most palatable and least challenging seems prudent. Yet, palatability does not necessarily stem perceived status threats. Moreover, palatability potentially obstructs consideration of viable and needed alternative solutions, redirects backlash toward more vulnerable segments of
minoritized groups, and fails to challenge cultural beliefs that undergird status
hierarchies. Better understanding status, then, can provide guidance on when
litigation decisions may incur long-term status costs that undermine a short-term
victory, and when alternatives to litigation warrant increased focus instead.
B. Policy
In the absence of a jurisprudence that can effectively engage status conflicts, policy becomes all the more important in advancing equality. And, like
in litigation, understanding status can help policymakers and equality advocates better assess options. Just as doctrine and litigation are shaped by status
issues, so too are the policy choices meant to effectuate doctrine. Thinking
with more precision about both the potential and limitations of accounting for
status in policy will be useful for ensuring long-term equality wins.
In the context of race and school integration, where policy is highly salient, 239 social scientists have found that “racial competition dynamics hasten[ed] . . . retreat from court-ordered desegregation,” and that such “desegregation orders [were] at an increased risk of [termination] as black population
237
Marie-Amélie George, The LGBT Disconnect: Politics and Perils of Legal Movement Formation, 2018 WIS. L. REV. 503, 515–18.
238
See generally id. (canvassing key strategic choices that powerful LGBT civil rights organizations made that have created a hierarchy which places transgendered individuals at the bottom, thus
creating opportunities for those opposed to such rights to focus on denying transgender rights as part
of overall attack on LGBTQ equality).
239
This is not to say that same-sex marriage is self-actualizing, but only that—unlike marriage
that can be pursued at the initiative of two individuals—public school integration cannot be initiated at
the behest of a small group of students, and instead requires a broad coordinated effort between local,
state, and federal school officials. For a rich exploration of the broader coordination needed to address
inequality embedded in the process of shifting legal relational status from unmarried to married
among same-sex couples, see Suzanne A. Kim, Transitional Equality, 53 U. RICH. L. REV. 1149
(2019).
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shares” of a region surpassed forty percent. 240 “Correspond[ing] to contexts
where desegregation will create [majority-minority] schools” or reflect “substantial [Black] political power,” this tipping point suggests that status issues
are at play. 241
One sociologist, however, argues that policymakers can affect segregation
by regulating forms of status competition. Racial competition theories suggest
that “whites monopolize access to high-status schools,” and will “resist or flee”
when “competing groups threaten [that] monopoly” and the higher relative social position that monopoly ensures. 242 The success of desegregation, therefore,
will depend in part “on the costs and . . . barriers to . . . resistance” and exit. 243
This framing should raise new concerns about education policies like
school choice, often presented as an alternative to reform policies that focus on
integration. White parents are more likely to use race as a heuristic for school
quality. 244 At the same time, school choice policies problematically encourage
the sort of competition that renders some schools as “better” than others.
School choice also depends on decentralized assignment policies vulnerable to
school monopoly by more powerful parents. School choice, then, is likely only
to aggravate status obstacles to education equality. Rejecting school choice
initiatives as the result of a status-informed assessment is just one example of
how status might be used to enhance assessment of policies adopted to advance equality.
The question of public accommodations service for same-sex couples,
however, does illustrate the limitations of policy decisions. Masterpiece
Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission and State v. Arlene’s
Flowers, Inc. involved attempts by state governments in Colorado and Washington to ensure that gays and lesbians enjoyed the same accommodations as
straight people. 245 There are reasons to believe that broadening access to public
240
Jeremy E. Fiel & Yongjun Zhang, With All Deliberate Speed: The Reversal of Court-Ordered
School Desegregation, 1970-2013, 124 AM. J. SOCIOLOGY 1685, 1715 (2019).
241
Id.
242
Fiel, supra note 139, at 131. This is most likely to happen in regions where racial and ethnic
boundaries are most salient. Id. at 159.
243
Id. at 133.
244
See supra notes 46–48 and accompanying text (discussing how white parents make school
choices for their children); see also Steven Glazerman & Dallas Dotter, Market Signals: Evidence on
the Determinants and Consequences of School Choice from a Citywide Lottery, 39 EDUC. EVALUATION & POL’Y ANALYSIS 593, 593 (2017) (studying school-choice preferences); Amy Stuart Wells,
Opinion, From One White Parent to Another: Don’t Pick Schools Because They’re Selective and
Mostly White, HECHINGER REP. (Mar. 6, 2019), https://hechingerreport.org/opinion-from-one-whiteparent-to-another-dont-pick-schools-because-theyre-selective-and-mostly-white/ [https://perma.cc/
8H6A-6P2F] (discussing how white parents may choose a school for “status and prestige”).
245
COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-601 (2021); WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.030 (2021); Masterpiece
Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1723 (2018); Arlene’s Flowers, 389 P.3d 543, 548–50 (Wash. 2017),
vacated and remanded mem., 138 S. Ct. 2671 (2018).
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accommodations is the type of a policy decision likely to undercut markers of
differentiated status while avoiding visceral backlash: a profit incentive motivates business owners to maximize their capacity for service; “public accommodations [operate] at the periphery” of the socio-economic order; 246 and the
ease of identifying discrimination and articulating remedy in the public accommodations context is a straightforward one. 247 These factors likely contributed to the ease with which segregation in public accommodations was dismantled relative to schooling integration, which has proved more intractable.
Nevertheless, the reality is that discrimination in public accommodations
endures, often going unmonitored or ignored all together. 248 Moreover, cases
like Masterpiece Cakeshop and Bostock v. Clayton County leave unresolved
the status question that lies at the heart of a future clash between religious liberty and equality. 249 Policy, therefore, cannot always address status in and of
itself, particularly in the absence of more progressive jurisprudence.
C. Narratives Surrounding Status Loss
Studies suggest that whites are more likely to understand racial progress
as a zero-sum game, 250 and are increasingly more likely to perceive that discrimination against whites is a bigger problem than discrimination against
Blacks. 251 Facilitated by an equal protection narrative that frames whites as
innocent victims of presumptively unconstitutional race-conscious remedies to
address discrimination, whites are increasingly likely to understand themselves

246
See Brian K. Landsberg, Public Accommodations and the Civil Rights Act of 1964: A Surprising Success?, 36 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 1, 19 (2015) (citing Bayard Rustin, From Protest to
Politics, in BLACK PROTEST THOUGHT IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 444, 444–45 (August Meier,
Elliott Rudwick & Francis L. Broderick eds., 2d ed. 1971)).
247
See id. at 20 (quoting NAT’L HISTORIC LANDMARKS PROGRAM, NAT’L PARK SERV., CIVIL
RIGHTS IN AMERICA: RACIAL DESEGREGATION OF PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS 85 (2009), https://
www.nps.gov/subjects/nationalhistoriclandmarks/upload/Civil-Rights-Public-Accomodations-2018final.pdf [https://perma.cc/769M-RN5L]; and then quoting 3 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE:
THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 172 (2014)) (arguing that unlike other civil rights, public accommodations laws do not prompt “questions about racial preferences and quotas”).
248
See generally Shaun Ossei-Owusu, Velvet Rope Discrimination, 107 VA. L. REV. 683 (2021)
(analyzing inattention to discrimination in public accommodations).
249
See supra notes 209–211 and accompanying text (discussing the Masterpiece Cakeshop and
Bostock cases). See generally Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1719–32 (leaving the question of
status unresolved in the Court’s analysis); Bostock, 140 S. Ct. 1731–54 (2020) (same).
250
Michael I. Norton & Samuel R. Sommers, Whites See Racism as a Zero-Sum Game That They
Are Now Losing, 6 PERSPS. PSYCH. SCI. 215, 215 (2011); see also Rebecca Aviel, Rights as a ZeroSum Game, 61 ARIZ. L. REV. 351, 368–71 (2019) (considering the connection between whites’ increasing perception of reverse-discrimination and equal protection jurisprudence affirming the existence of reverse-discrimination).
251
FRED L. PINCUS, REVERSE DISCRIMINATION: DISMANTLING THE MYTH, at x–xi, 3–9 (2003).
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as losers in a more egalitarian society. 252 Rising anxiety among whites about
the security, or lack thereof, of their social status 253 has been credited for everything from the results of the 2016 presidential election 254 to an increase in
conservative and populist right ideology among white people. 255
Further, the term “[w]ages of [w]hiteness” is derived from theories about
the development of working-class racism in the United States; according to
some historians, whiteness and white supremacy were central to the identity
development of white workers in opposition to Black workers. 256 In this vein,
entire political campaigns have been critiqued as having been successfully
built through appeals to whiteness, even as those campaigns ultimately adopted
252
The theme of white innocence informs Supreme Court doctrine on race-conscious initiatives,
shaping outcomes in a string of cases. E.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 294–
95 n.34 (1978); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 276 (1986); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 306, 341 (2003); Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 750
(2007) (Thomas, J., concurring). For additional exploration of the white innocence theme as manifest
in doctrine, plaintiff testimony, and the diversity rationale, see James, supra note 145, at 481–89;
Thomas Ross, Innocence and Affirmative Action, 43 VAND. L. REV. 297, 314–15 (1990); David Simson, Whiteness as Innocence, 96 DENV. L. REV. 635, 643–52 (2019).
253
See Tessa L. Dover, Brenda Major & Cheryl R. Kaiser, Members of High-Status Groups Are
Threatened by Pro-Diversity Organizational Messages, 62 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH. 58, 65
(2016) (finding that whites, as a “high-status group,” are threatened by pro-diversity organizational
messages, demonstrating concern about discrimination and exhibiting cardiovascular threat, and that
the ethnic/racial minorities studied did not exhibit the same responses).
254
See Diana C. Mutz, Status Threat, Not Economic Hardship, Explains the 2016 Presidential
Vote, 115 PNAS E4330, E4330 (2018) (concluding that while “change[s] in financial well-being had
little impact on candidate preference,” instead, “issues that threaten white Americans’ sense of dominant group status” did drive candidate preference); see also Mona Chalabi, Trump’s Angry White
Men—and Why There Are More of Them Than You Think, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 8, 2016), https://
www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/jan/08/angry-white-men-love-donald-trump [https://perma.cc/
5MC2-QXJS] (describing President Donald J. Trump’s appeal among “white men [who] are also
working or middle-class and middle-aged”); Sean McElwee & Jason McDaniel, Economic Anxiety
Didn’t Make People Vote Trump, Racism Did, THE NATION (May 8, 2017), https://www.thenation.
com/article/archive/economic-anxiety-didnt-make-people-vote-trump-racism-did/ [https://perma.cc/
PXE7-J38E] (discussing the role of racism in the 2016 presidential election). But see Heather Digby
Parton, The Truth About Donald Trump’s Angry White Men: Inside the Media Narrative That the
Media Doesn’t Understand, SALON (Mar. 28, 2016), http://www.salon.com/2016/03/28/the_truth_
about_donald_trumps_angry_white_men_inside_the_media_narrative_that_the_media_doesnt_
understand [https://perma.cc/64AG-B34D] (arguing that angst about “misunderstood and underserved” white men is decades-old, dating back to the 1960s, and continuing throughout the 1970s to
the present).
255
Maureen A. Craig & Jennifer A. Richeson, Corrigendum, On the Precipice of a “MajorityMinority” America: Perceived Status Threat from the Racial Demographic Shift Affects White Americans’ Political Ideology, 26 PSYCH. SCI. 950, 952 (2015); see also Noam Gidron & Peter A. Hall, The
Politics of Social Status: Economic and Cultural Roots of the Populist Right, 68 BRIT. J. SOCIOLOGY
(SPECIAL ISSUE) S57, S57 (2017) (“[C]onclud[ing] that status effects provide one pathway through
which economic and cultural developments may combine to increase support for the populist right.”).
256
See generally DAVID R. ROEDIGER, THE WAGES OF WHITENESS: RACE AND THE MAKING OF
THE AMERICAN WORKING CLASS (rev. 3d ed. 2007) (providing an overview of working-class racism
in the United States).
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economic policies hostile to middle and working-class whites. 257 Ultimately,
literature on the self-defeating nature of white racial resentments is a genre
unto itself. 258 Nevertheless, status compels policymakers and equality advocates to consider not only how progressive policies like school integration or
same-sex marriage provide social and economic benefits, but also how the narrative surrounding those policies can undercut or enhance consensual beliefs
that inform status hierarchy. 259 Current appeals in support of affirmative action,
for example, tout the benefits of “diversity” to white and non-white students.
This conception of diversity, however, renders people of color in service positions, present on college campuses to help whites develop cultural competence
in an increasingly diverse labor market, dispensable when the costs for whites
become too high. 260 Diversity deployed in this manner entrenches status differentials and does not invoke the immediate and material consequences that
might animate coalition building.
In contrast, one economics historian writes about the importance of alternate narratives regarding civil rights gains. Most Southern whites resistant to
the civil rights movement perceived “Civil Rights demands as economically
threatening”—even if they lacked the self-awareness to understand that concerns about racial status animated that perception. 261 In fact, as a result of the
movement, Blacks in the South did make strong economic gains “relative to
earlier levels, relative to southern whites, and relative to national standards.” 262
These gains, however, were not made “at the expense of white southerners”;
rather, civil rights gains were “economically beneficial for whites as well as
blacks,” including working-class white Southerners, “and for the regional
257
See generally ANGIE MAXWELL & TODD SHIELDS, THE LONG SOUTHERN STRATEGY: HOW
CHASING WHITE VOTERS IN THE SOUTH CHANGED AMERICAN POLITICS (2019) (discussing voting
campaigns and Southern voters’ effect on politics).
258
See generally JONATHAN M. METZL, DYING OF WHITENESS: HOW THE POLITICS OF RACIAL
RESENTMENT IS KILLING AMERICA’S HEARTLAND (2019) (discussing the politics surrounding racial
resentment); JASON SOKOL, THERE GOES MY EVERYTHING: WHITE SOUTHERNERS IN THE AGE OF
CIVIL RIGHTS, 1945-1975 (2006) (same).
259
See, e.g., Rachel Wetts & Robb Willer, Privilege on the Precipice: Perceived Racial Status
Threats Lead White Americans to Oppose Welfare Programs, 97 SOC. FORCES 793, 793 (2018) (finding that “whites’ perceptions that minorities’ [relative] standing is rising can produce periods of ‘welfare backlash’”).
260
James, supra note 145, at 492–94.
261
GAVIN WRIGHT, SHARING THE PRIZE: THE ECONOMICS OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION IN
THE AMERICAN SOUTH 26 (2013). This slippage is reflected in the current political moment by academic analysis that consistently identifies racial status as a motivating factor for white political activity, even as whites deny that race is at issue. See, e.g., Brian F. Schaffner, Matthew MacWilliams &
Tatishe Nteta, Understanding White Polarization in the 2016 Vote for President: The Sobering Role of
Racism and Sexism, 133 POL. SCI. Q. 9, 10 (2018) (concluding that although “economic considerations” were a pertinent driver of white voting patterns in the 2016 election, “racial attitudes and sexism were much more strongly related to support for Trump”).
262
WRIGHT, supra note 261, at 26.
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economy more generally.” 263 Although the apparatus of Jim Crow was compatible with Southern economic life 264 and worked for whites, integration actually
worked better, settling contentious racial issues that allowed political and business leaders to pursue a growth agenda. 265
The narrative around the civil rights revolution, therefore, is inaccurate in
its presentation as a “program of redistribution”; a more accurate narrative is
that the movement integrated citizens previously marginalized from the mainstream economy, for the benefit of all. 266 One scholar qualifies his findings,
noting that this integration was an example of “what can be accomplished under favorable conditions through concerted, purposeful government policy in a
mutually supportive partnership with grassroots political mobilization.” 267
Nevertheless, it remains a case study in the necessity and value of dismantling
the zero-sum notions that the status-privileged can harbor about equality.
Other scholars similarly highlight the value of laying bare the disadvantages of status hierarchies for the privileged. One researcher’s work on
race, pregnancy, and the opioid crisis, for example, details how the superior
social status of whites has not only subjected them to harmful eugenics practices meant to preserve that status, 268 but also laid the groundwork for the punitive response to white women caught in the opioid crisis. 269 Because earlier
waves of addiction crises impacted Black communities, the state responded
through a lens of criminality rather than public health; now that whites are the
primary victims of the opioid crisis, white pregnant women are subject to the
devastating response architecture that racism helped build. 270
Additional examples abound. Stereotypes of the Black “Welfare Queen”
popularized during the 1980s informed a dismantling of the social safety net
that has negatively impacted poor families and children of all races, including
whites. 271 Gender stereotypes may disadvantage women, but they also hurt the
Id. at 27–30 (emphasis added).
Id. at 29.
265
Wages, employment, and even school test scores progressed for all as Blacks made civil rights
gains. Id. at 29–30.
266
Id.
267
Id. at 262.
268
Khiara M. Bridges, Race, Pregnancy, and the Opioid Epidemic: White Privilege and the
Criminalization of Opioid Use During Pregnancy, 133 HARV. L. REV. 770, 828–32 (2020).
269
Id. at 775.
270
Id. at 775, 837.
271
See Ann Cammett, Deadbeat Dads & Welfare Queens: How Metaphor Shapes Poverty Law,
34 B.C. J.L. & SOC. JUST. 233, 239 (2014) (documenting how racialized metaphors regarding “Welfare Queens” and “Deadbeat Dads” “accelerate[d] the widespread eradication of the social safety
net”). See generally ANGE-MARIE HANCOCK, THE POLITICS OF DISGUST: THE PUBLIC IDENTITY OF
THE WELFARE QUEEN (2004) (arguing that widespread beliefs about poor Black mothers provided
foundations for the radical restructuring and curtailment of welfare in the mid-1990s).
263
264

2022]

Relational Obstacles in the Law to Racial Justice and LGBTQ Equality

253

men who apply for jobs that women traditionally staff. 272 Greater rhetorical
clarity is needed around the benefits of dismantling status hierarchies, and the
harms of preserving status hierarchies, even for the status privileged.
This call for engagement regarding the harms of inequality even for the
privileged brings to mind Derrick Bell’s work on interest convergence. As Bell
wrote:
The interest of blacks in achieving racial equality will be accommodated only when it converges with the interests of whites. . . . [T]he
fourteenth amendment, standing alone, will not authorize a judicial
remedy providing effective racial equality for blacks where the remedy sought threatens the superior societal status of middle and upper
class whites. 273
Indeed, a transactional approach to addressing status can be disheartening. Engaging status, however, must also be about reframing. Equality movements and
political initiatives meant to implement the outcomes of those movements are
often debated and characterized through public discourse. Pushing back on
unfounded beliefs in zero-sum progress will be central to addressing the obstacle that status hierarchies can present on the path toward freedom. During a
time when the upside of American capitalism is disproportionately enjoyed by
an increasingly limited segment of society, such discourse might fall on particularly receptive ears.
CONCLUSION
Sixty-five years after the Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of Education, public schools today are more segregated than they were at the time of the
Court’s landmark ruling, with racial isolation in schools for Blacks, Latinos,
and whites on the rise. This gradual return to racial segregation, even as racial
attitudes are purportedly improving, is a steady winnowing away of the 1954
victory that enhanced the status of Blacks relative to whites. If the everweakening Brown legacy is any lesson, the victory of Obergefell v. Hodges
might be similarly undone down the road.
272
Jill Yavorsky, Hiring-related Discrimination: Sexist Beliefs and Expectations Hurt Both Women’s and Men’s Career Options, COUNCIL ON CONTEMP. FAMS. (Jan. 16, 2019), https://contemporary
families.org/hiringdiscrimination/ [https://perma.cc/4RPH-PNND] (finding “no discrimination against
women in the early hiring phases when they applied for male-dominated middle-class jobs,” evidence
of significant discrimination against “working-class women applying for traditionally male-dominated
working-class jobs,” and discrimination against men applying for traditionally female-dominated jobs
“in both working class and middle-class contexts”).
273
Derrick A Bell, Jr., Comment, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence
Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 523 (1980) (emphasis added).
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Nor are status issues limited to marriage or education. Rather, status is
central to any number of political and legal societal conflicts. Immigration debates embody the most fundamental version of status: who counts as belonging
to a polity? 274 And the public debates between cis-gendered and transgendered
women remind us that status hierarchies exist along multiple axes of identity. 275
Ultimately, status may be an inevitable part of the human experience, but
that should not preclude thinking with more specificity about how to acknowledge status in the fight for equality. More than a symbol of what is at stake,
status itself is what is at stake, and those stakes quietly, but powerfully, shape
the trajectory and import of reform attempts. Better theorizing the role of status
in major equality movements can limit equality’s drag, resulting in more robust
and enduring equality wins.

274
For thoughtful explorations of immigration, alienage, and status, see generally Hiroshi Motomura, Who Belongs?: Immigration Outside the Law and the Idea of Americans in Waiting, 2 U.C.
IRVINE L. REV. 359 (2012) (arguing that “viewing immigrants, including unauthorized migrants, as
Americans in waiting is essential to reconciling the tension between national borders and . . . a national commitment to equality”); LINDA BOSNIAK, THE CITIZEN AND THE ALIEN: DILEMMAS OF CONTEMPORARY MEMBERSHIP (2006).
275
See Michelle Goldberg, What Is a Woman? The Dispute Between Radical Feminism and
Transgenderism, NEW YORKER (July 28, 2014), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/08/04/
woman-2 [https://perma.cc/2DHX-DJXR] (documenting tensions between the political left and radical
feminists, the latter of whom concluding that transgender women are men who should not be permitted to attend women’s events or facilities). Controversy regarding the exclusion of transwomen from
the 2019 BET Black Girls Rock! Awards is another example, highlighting the implication of multiple
axes of identity. Victoria Uwumarogie, Pose Star Angelica Ross Calls Out BET for Excluding Trans
Women from Black Girls Rock!, MADAMENOIRE (Sept. 9, 2019), https://madamenoire.com/1098488/
black-trans-girls-rock/ [https://perma.cc/FFY6-L22U].

